



## Dream of European Army: is it a Feasible Objective or Not?

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### ABSTRACT

The European Union's (EU) defense initiatives have changed over time, reflecting both the pursuit of security and defense goals and the shifting dynamics of European integration. To improve defense cooperation and create a common defense strategy for the EU, several initiatives have been made. The EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), which strives to strengthen its capacity to handle security concerns and preserve stability, has a significant influence on defense-related operations. We have witnessed new security and military efforts from the EU in the first two decades of the 2000s, such as the European Security Strategy, EU's Global Strategy, and Security Compass. The announcement of the creation of the European Army was heavily made on November 13, 2017. Europe should be able to act independently in areas of defense and security rather than merely relying on the US or NATO. Because of these kinds of reservations, desires to pursue more advanced capabilities on their own have been raised.

There has been a lot of debate and analysis around the reasons for and against the formation of a European Army. Why is the idea of a European Army so heavily investigated? Is building such an army a realistic goal or not? What are the benefits, drawbacks, and challenges to achieving it? Who is in favor of and against building an army in Europe? These are the primary questions that we attempt to address in this article.

If the European Army becomes a reality, it is predicted that Europe will finally be able to effectively defend itself with a unified force without outside support. Here the most important thing is strong political will and a common point of view for the creation of a European Army. If the most significant aim is to defend different European interests, a crucial question arises: What are the interests of Europe, and who defines them?

**Keywords:** European Union, NATO, CSDP, ESS, European Army.

## Avrupa Ordusu Hayali: Gerçekleşmesi Mümkün Bir Hedef Mi?

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### ÖZ

Zaman içinde Avrupa Birliği (AB) savunma alanında pek çok girişim ortaya koymuştur. Bu doğrultuda hem güvenlik ve savunma hedeflerinin peşinden gitmiş, hem de Avrupa entegrasyonunun değişen dinamiklerine uyum sağlamaya çalışmıştır. AB'nin Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası (OGSP), güvenlik endişeleriyle başa çıkma kapasitesini güçlendirmeyi ve istikrarı korumayı hedefleyen bir politika olarak savunma ile ilgili operasyonlarda önemli bir etkiye sahip olmuştur. Ancak 2000'li yılların başından bugüne değin AB'nin Güvenlik Stratejisi, Küresel Stratejisi ve Güvenlik Pusulası gibi AB'nin güvenlik bağlamında yeni bazı inisiyatifleri söz konusu olmuştur. 2017 yılı itibarı ile bir Avrupa ordusu kurma düşüncesi ve arzusu yüksek sesle dile getirilmeye başlanmıştır. Temel motivasyon Avrupa'nın, sadece ABD veya NATO'ya güvenmek yerine savunma ve güvenlik alanlarında bağımsız hareket edebilme yeteneğine sahip olmasıydı. Bu tür endişelerin itici gücüyle artık Avrupa'nın savunma ve güvenlik bağlamında kendi başlarına daha ileri yeteneklere sahip olma isteğini artırdığını söyleyebiliriz.

Bir "Avrupa ordusu" kurulması ile ilgili olarak birçok tartışma yaşanmaktadır. Avrupa ordusu fikri neden bu kadar yoğun bir şekilde araştırılmaktadır? Böyle bir ordunun oluşturulması gerçekçi bir hedef midir yoksa değil midir? Bunun gerçekleştirilmesinin avantaj ve dezavantajları nelerdir? Bir Avrupa ordusu kurma fikrini kimler neden desteklemektedirler? Tüm bu sorular makalemizde ele almaya çalışacağımız konuları ortaya koymaktadır.

Eğer Avrupa Ordusu hayali gerçeğe dönüşürse, beklenti Avrupa'nın sonunda kendisini dışarıdan desteğe ihtiyaç duymadan etkili bir şekilde savunabileceği yönünde. Burada gerekli olan en önemli şey güçlü bir siyasi irade ve bir Avrupa Ordusu'nun yaratılması bağlamında tüm üye devletlerin ortak bir bakış açısına sahip olmasıdır. Eğer en önemli amaç Avrupa'nın çıkarlarını savunmaksa, sorulması gereken soru Avrupa'nın çıkarları nelerdir ve bunları kim tanımlamaktadır?

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Avrupa Birliği, NATO, AGSP, AGS, Avrupa Ordusu

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## Introduction

The EU has focused on several issues, including the development of the European defense industry, the marketization of the sector, and defense industrial policy. The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), which aims to improve the EU's capabilities to address security issues and maintain stability, has a substantial impact on defense-related operations. Additionally, the EU has emphasized the significance of developing a European Army and gaining strategic autonomy. In recent years, there has been an increase in recalls for the creation a European Army. In the twenty-first century, there are more threats than there were, thus the EU cannot rely entirely on the US for security. Even while it could now be judged necessary, EU authorities are still uncertain of how to put one up and under which conditions it would work (Avezou, 2021).

In the first two decades of 2000s, we witnessed new security and defense initiatives by the EU such as the European Security Strategy and EU's Global Strategy but 2013 was the turning point because the US deployed its new nuclear weapons in Europe. On 13 November 2017, the establishment of the European Army was announced. 23 Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs of the EU met in Brussels on 13 November and signed a Permanent Structured Cooperation agreement (PESCO). The aim of the agreement is to develop defense power, cooperation, and rapid action capability among member states. Signing this agreement can be accepted as a historical moment and is a concrete expression of the EU's revolt against the Atlantic. PESCO participants will inform the defense partnership EDA (European Defense Agency) of their prospects. The command center is the most crucial component of all processes. Regarding NATO, the offensive alliance of the Atlantic, this center will make sure that Europe controls its own destiny. The epicenter of the "common conflicts of Europe" will be there. The US is so undeniably losing its most crucial Atlantic pillar for global dominance, and its isolation grows.

The arguments in favor of and against the creation of a European Army have received extensive discussion and analysis. When an action is perceived to occur in the distant future, considerations in favor of it tend to become more salient, whereas when it is perceived to occur soon, considerations in opposition to it tend to become more noticeable. In addition, discussions about national identity and the usefulness of national frames of reference have been embedded within broader discussions about a European Army. In terms of military integration, as well as a response to geopolitical and technological developments, the idea of a European Army has also been discussed. The discussions have also touched on historical issues, such as the standing army discussions and the incentives brought about by various institutional configurations.

This introduction lays the groundwork for a thorough examination of the arguments for and against the formation of a European Army, considering elements like

historical context, national identity, military integration, and temporal considerations. Understanding the history and complexity of the debates can be improved by looking at these aspects. In this article, firstly we will try to examine the historical background of the EU's defense initiatives. Secondly, we aim to evaluate current debates, about the European Army. While doing this also we will try to make some explanations about the "pros" and "cons" concerning the desire to create a European Army. Moreover, France's and Germany's motivations for the European Army and the US's point of view on the subject will be evaluated.

## Historical Background of the EU's Security and Defense Initiatives

European military cooperation as a concept was originally proposed in 1948. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) helped the continent's economic cooperation in advance, but it was more difficult for political collaboration to take shape. Aside from that, the Korean War occurred, and the US began to push the French to consider controlling the rearmament of Germany to potentially assist the shared European defense' in case it was necessary. The phrase "Pleven Plan" was used to describe this plan. The French prime minister's Pleven Plan, which was proposed in October 1950, called for a single European Army so the latest demands for a European Army and a common defense budget made by Emmanuel Macron are nothing new. A plan for the European Defense Community (EDC) was first put forth in the 1950s, when the Cold War was probably at its top level. It was proposed by the French Prime Minister Pleven and called for the resurrected forty-division force to take the place of the armies of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the Benelux nations (Lak, 2018:140).

After observing the achievements of the ECSC, Jean Claude Monnet, the father of the concept, realized that a European Army might be the most expedient means of achieving a political and deeper integration amongst the European countries. In response to American demands on Germany's rearmament and joining NATO in 1950, French Prime Minister Renè Pleven proposed the idea of creating a pan-European defense architecture under the European Defense Community (EDC) (Telesca&Caliva, 2018: 2). The earliest and most successful attempt to start military-political unification was the development and signing of the European Defense Community Treaty (EDC) (Yakoviyk et.al. 2020:227). Essentially, the EDC was created with two objectives in mind: first, to protect Western Europe from the USSR which was seen as a threat, and second, to incorporate West Germany into the European defense community without allowing it to have its own army. These two objectives, together with Robert Schuman's suggestion to supranationally pool European steel and coal, were both equally innovative. Since the late 1940s, the re-armament of West Germany has been a contentious and divisive issue. West Germany was not

allowed to join NATO, and France supported the Pleven Plan. Despite being ratified by the French parliament in August 1954, the EDC treaty was never put into effect after being signed on May 27, 1952 (Lak, 2018:140). The United States (US), which regarded EDC as a vehicle for reunifying West Germany, supported this program (Yakoviyk et.al. 2020:227). The US, which at the time also had a significant role in NATO, was to be excluded from the EDC along with West Germany, France, Italy, and Benelux. The idea was to give France a starring role in the EDC. A pan-European supranational military with national components “at the level of the smallest conceivable unit” and under the command of a European Minister of Defense was the vision of the EDC (Telesca & Caliva, 2018: 2).

In an ironic turn of events, the French Parliament’s failure to ratify the EDC prevented it from going into effect. Elite French political figures started to worry that the EDC may endanger the country’s sovereignty because of the leadership transition in French national politics. The end of the Korean War and the death of Joseph Stalin had a significant and a negative influence on the previous push for the construction of an army in Europe since it was believed that the Soviet danger was no longer as acute as it was. As a result, the plan’s failure was foreshadowed by the French National Assembly’s reluctance to endorse it in 1954 (Telesca & Caliva, 2018: 2). To be fair, it should be noted that even if the EDC was approved, the European Army’s actual independence would be negligible because it would have to enlist in NATO and submit to The Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

The German question continued to be discussed after the EDC’s failure. Several decisions were made at a meeting of the Nine Powers (France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States), which was held in London from September 28 to October 3, 1954. These included putting an end to the occupation rule in the Federal Republic of Germany and regaining the nation’s sovereignty, keeping controls on German rearmament by altering the 1948 Brussels Treaty, Italy’s adhesion to the modified Brussels Treaty, and the Federal Republic of Germany’s membership in NATO. In addition to assuring France about German rearmament, the United Kingdom’s promise to keep troops on the European continent also prevented the evacuation of US forces. Then, in May 1955, the Treaty of Paris established that West Germany would in fact join the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO, which automatically resulted in the nation being rear (Lak, 2018:140; www.cvce.eu). The WEU member states, along with the US and Canada as members of NATO, made up the Western Bloc during the Cold War. Establishment of the WEU cannot be accepted as isolation from NATO, they are interrelated and cannot be seen as independent from each other. In actuality, the primary goal of the European nations was to urge the US to support the defense of Europe.

Another significant turning point for Europe occurred in the 1960s. This was France’s decision to withdraw from NATO’s military wing. As a result of deteriorating ties between Washington and Paris over the country’s refusal

to integrate its nuclear deterrent with other North Atlantic powers or to accept any collective form of control over its armed forces, French President Charles de Gaulle downgraded France’s membership in NATO and withdrew France from the NATO’s Military Command Structure in 1966. This was done to pursue more independent defense options (Edward, 2009). The creation of an autonomous nuclear force was the cornerstone of Gaullist defense philosophy. Even while it pales in comparison to the massive arsenals used by the two superpowers, it is nevertheless sufficiently damaging to dissuade an attacker (Dobbs, 1983). Following its military withdrawal, France pushed for stronger European defenses, especially the assumption that the 12 nations of the European Community should play a role in doing so as it created a single foreign and security policy.

The European Political Cooperation (EPC) of the European Communities underwent attempts to include a security component beginning in the late 1970s. During the 1970s, Belgian politician Étienne Davignon proposed what is known as the “Davignon report or Davignon Plan. Its goal was to discuss the problem of European integration and the WEU’s part in the process. In the concept, it was suggested that the WEU be changed into a political and armed organization that would operate alongside the European Economic Community (EEC), which later evolved into the EU. The report stressed the requirement for more integration and coordination between European nations in matters of security and foreign policy. To cooperate with the European Economic Community (EEC), it was proposed that the Western European Union (WEU) be transformed into a political and military organization. The Davignon Report attempted to improve European defense capabilities, encourage member state cooperation, and create a single foreign strategy. It was not entirely realized, nevertheless, due to difficulties. To ensure security and stability in Western Europe and to advance European integration, the plan highlighted Belgian efforts in these areas (Kneucker, 1999). In fact, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was developed because of the Davignon Report’s implementation. It strengthened the notion of a unified foreign policy for all of Europe and offered the institutional framework for realizing it. The report stressed the need for social justice and protection while underlining the significance of human rights as a fundamental aspect of Europe’s history and mission. The Davignon Report was instrumental in advancing European integration and encouraging closer member state coordination on issues of security and foreign policy. It helped to build the CFSP and reaffirmed how crucial human rights are in determining Europe’s foreign policy priorities.

In response to opposition to these initiatives from Denmark, Greece, and Ireland, the remaining EC nations - all WEU members- adopted the Rome Declaration in 1984, to reactivate the WEU. The Modified Brussels Treaty’s clauses had only occasionally been used up until this point (Wessel, 2001). The Rome Declaration of 1984 was a significant turning point in the evolution of the European Union (EU). The declaration set forth a vision for the

organization's future development and addressed the possibilities and difficulties that was currently experiencing. The Rome Declaration placed a strong emphasis on the necessity of closer cooperation among the member states as well as European integration. It emphasized adherence to democratic, human rights-based, and legal principles. A single foreign and security policy was also highlighted, along with the significance of economic and social solidarity. The Rome Declaration also demanded that the internal market be finished, that the organization's role in the world be strengthened, and that its institutional foundation be improved. The Single European Act of 1986 and subsequent treaties were made possible because it set the stage for increased integration and collaboration within the organization. Overall, the Rome Declaration of 1984 had a significant impact on the direction the organization would take and the depth of its integration.

During the revival of the WEU between the 27 October 1984 Rome Declaration and the 26 October 1987 Hague Platform on European Security Interests, Europeans had the chance to think about their own security, support the idea of creating an integrated Europe that included security and defense aspects, and reinforce the European component of the Alliance. The WEU's existence reflected the efforts of Western European countries to enhance their collective security and defense cooperation. Its dissolution marked a further integration of defense policies within the framework of the EU and the strengthening of the CSDP (Chrysochoou et al., 2018).

The WEU was involved in coordinating military cooperation and defense policy among its member states. It put a heavy emphasis on matters like crisis management, arms control, and defense planning. However, its significance diminished over time, especially after the Cold War ended. One of the outcomes of the end of the Cold War, the fall of the USSR, the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact, and the accession of the former communist countries of Europe to NATO and the EU was the lack of a true adversary. The absence of a true opponent gave the EU Member States a sense of security. However, there has been a major change in the tone of discussions concerning European security and defense during the past thirty years. It's because unipolarity is being established as the new benchmark for the world's political order, replacing the defunct bipolar equilibrium around which the European security architecture was constructed. The EU is increasingly in need of creating its own collective security system outside of NATO because of the deteriorating security situation at its borders because of Russia's and other countries' policies that jeopardize its ability to defend its interests and values. Over the past ten years, the EU security agenda has placed a high priority on turmoil in Europe's periphery (Yakoviyk et al., 2020:225-27).

The new world order, as envisioned by former US President George H. W. Bush, came into being with the end of the Cold War. In its eastern neighbors, the world order opened a window for more European leadership,

increased cooperation, and significant political unification progress. The renewal of efforts to establish a European Army in Western Europe was one unexpected effect of the demise of the USSR (Dedman& Fleay,1992:11).

The fall of the USSR, the original impetus for a single European defense, suggested the revival of the notion of a European Army in Western Europe. This was a crucial action in which the 1992 Petersberg Tasks were held. The Western European Union was given control over the Petersberg missions by the 1992 Petersberg Declaration. The missions asked that military units from WEU Member States be used for humanitarian, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding missions. The emergence of the internal Yugoslav crisis and the obvious need for US intervention in Kosovo to put an end to the conflict proved that the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was adopted in 1993 under the Maastricht Treaty, lacked coherence and effectiveness and that it required reform. Germany as a result to ensure advancement in European defense, France and the United Kingdom have taken the lead. Developing an independent European military capability was the focus of the ensuing Franco-German and British-French summits, which were held in Potsdam and Saint Malo, respectively, in 1998. However, rather than creating a separate European Army, the St. Malo Declaration of 1998 emphasized the necessity for a European Rapid Reaction Force capable of carrying out the Petersberg Tasks (Telesca& Caliva, 2018: 2-3). By the end of that year, Europe intends to begin making serious progress toward the formation of a credible, cohesive military force. During a conference in Helsinki, Finland, in December 1999, the leaders of the European Union (EU) declared their intention to create a fast reaction force. This army could deploy up to 60,000 soldiers overseas in only two months and keep them there for at least a year. It could even operate autonomously. The official countdown began at that same minute. A new Political and Security Committee, a Military Staff that may advise EU leaders, and a Military Committee of defense chiefs modeled after the Military Committee of NATO were also announced as part of the announcement (Gordon, 2000:12).

In the 1990s, EU leaders came to realize the CFSP's incoherence and inefficiency and held the opinion that a strong European defense policy would have avoided conflict altogether. Europeans were further incensed by NATO's leadership in Kosovo and Clinton's refusal to serve as a mediator. Although the total number of uniformed men was outstanding, the Europeans first found it more difficult to deploy 50,000 troops than the Americans did (Biscop, 2012). The deficiencies inspired leaders to implement radical defense reforms in and within European defense industries. It must be mentioned that Tony Blair, changed the British perspective on European defense, which reopened the "horizon of possibilities" (Hellman, et. al., 2005:157). Romano Prodi, former President of the European Commission, naturally spoke in support of a European Army, stating that eventually, Europe should have a unified foreign policy, which logically would lead to a common defense strategy and a common army (BBC News, May 9, 1999).

The Helsinki Declaration was widely regarded as a symbol of Europe's new determination to take greater responsibility for its security and perhaps establish an independent military force after decades of failed attempts to develop a strong European military capability. By the end of 2000, the new initiative is expected to be in place. This initiative can be accepted as more serious than its predecessors for some reasons. First, a full-scale engagement with the United Kingdom is made for the first time, as its troops are essential to any effective European military. Second, the war in Kosovo showed Europeans how militarily reliant on Washington they are and will continue to be until significant reforms are done. Third, the Helsinki Declaration does not call for the revival of the Western European Union (WEU), which has been dormant for a very long time. Creating a credible EU defense force, if done right, could benefit all parties by lowering American obligations in Europe, improving, and fortifying the alliance between Europe and the US, and giving Europeans a way to deal with security issues when and where the US is unable or unwilling to step in. What happens, though, if the EU plan is badly executed and turns out to be nothing more than a pointless legislative diversion or even worse, a relapse into the circumstances in the Balkans in the early 1990s, when inconsistencies between European and American institutions caused hopelessness and blame. Therefore, it is important to balance the pros and cons of a stronger and more independent EU with the risks that the new initiative will widen the gap between Europe and America, duplicate expensive NATO structures and assets, alienate NATO's non-EU Member States like Türkiye, Norway, and Poland, and foster an unwarranted sense of military self-reliance in Europe (Gordon, 2000:12-13).

The majority of those taking part in the Helsinki project are familiar with this important idea. The EU defense initiative could, however, easily have a number of unintended and undesirable consequences given that European leaders are now firmly committed to giving the EU a significant role in foreign policy and defense, given that Washington is tempted by unilateralism and is pursuing a national missile defense program that is opposed by most Europeans, and given that tensions are still extremely high because of the pending problems with Bosnia and Kosovo. Together, Americans and Europeans must make sure that the new project strengthens the transatlantic alliance (Gordon, 2000:13).

Following the failure in Kosovo, the "Big Three" (France, Germany, and UK) played a crucial role in building the foundation for eventual advancements in European defense. The direction of the development of an independent military capability was greatly influenced by the French-German summit in Potsdam in December 1998, which was followed by the British-French summit in St. Malo. It was quite a feat for the French and the UK to agree that there was a need for high political collaboration when they normally disagreed since the UK had finally changed its ideas towards European defense (Rutten, 2001). The Atlanticist security preference prevailed when

offered the option of maintaining the existing quo, enhancing European defense systems within NATO, or pursuing defense capabilities entirely outside of NATO. The St. Malo Declaration's incorporation into a transatlantic yet European framework highlighted the desire for a European Rapid Reaction Force rather than a permanent European Army, as well as France's decision to forgo its detachment from NATO, in contrast to Blair's belief that Europe relied too heavily on the US and his eagerness to strengthen European defense capabilities (Winn, 2003:52).

At the St. Malo Summit, France, and the UK the only two nuclear armed European military forces and permanent members of the UN Security Council collaborated to dramatically develop European defense technologies. The two players developed the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), afterwards renamed Common Defense and Security Policy (CSDP) under the Lisbon Treaty, after putting aside their differences on defense-related issues to do so. The other member nations endorsed this plan and specified the tools to achieve ESDP at the Cologne Summit in 1999: the reform of the armament industry in six countries, (Andersson, 2015) CFSP and a set of rules to make sure that the EU could decide and conduct Petersberg operations effectively. Javier Solana, the former secretary general of NATO, was appointed (Grant, 1999). NATO approved the European plans for ESDP at the Washington summit on April 24, 1999, which was important for the legitimacy and expansion of the program (Hellman et. al., 2005:157).

Significant advancements in EU defense development were spurred by the proclamation. The European Defense and Security Policy, or EDSP as it was called in 2009 as part of the Lisbon Treaty, was launched by France and England as the defensive component of the CSFP. Currently, the CSDP serves as the primary pillar of the CFSP and enables the Union to intervene, taking the lead in missions throughout the globe to promote international security, avert conflicts, and conduct peacekeeping operations (Telesca and Caliva, 2018: 3).

It's crucial to remember that, even though the ESDP's tools did not equate to a standing army, the possibility of greater European independence in foreign policy and consequently, defense has significantly increased. The ESDP agreement provided the framework for following developments, including the need for fast reaction troops and transnational EU Battlegroups overseen by the European Defense Agency (EDA), which was founded in 2004. The Berlin Plus Agreement emphasized ESDP's goal of once again completing the current transatlantic security framework in addition to granting EU-led military operations access to NATO resources and planning skills (Mix, 2013).

The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) was established by the EU as a new policy direction in response to changes in the global and regional security sphere in the twenty-first century. Thanks to the novels about the Lisbon Treaty, CSDP has advanced significantly in recent years. To progress the CSDP, improve the overall defense

capability of EU Member States, and meet the need to boost European industry's competitiveness on the global market for security and defense, the European Council took resolutions in December 2013 and June 2015 (Yakoviyk et al., 2020:226).

As a result of the Lisbon Treaty, significant changes have been made to the EU's security and defense strategy. First, the Treaty stressed the EU's capacity to use the military and civilian instruments of CSDP to uphold peace, prevent conflict, and enhance global security. This strategy was novel because it expanded the scope of the Petersberg missions to include duties involving military advice and assistance as well as joint actions for disarmament, humanitarian and rescue missions, conflict prevention and peacekeeping missions, combat force crisis management missions, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization missions. All these responsibilities could be used to support a third country's efforts to combat terrorism on its own soil, among other ways. Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon establishes the normative commitment of the EU to conflict avoidance, management, and resolution as well as to enhancing global security generally. It aims to make the EU more powerful and morally upright on the international stage (Oproiou, 2012: 40-42).

#### **EU's Security Strategy (ESS-2003) and EU's Global Strategy (EUGS-2016)**

In the beginning of 2000's there was a new initiative in security and defense named ESS. The EU's Security Strategy (ESS) is a flexible framework that guides the EU's approach to security and defense. It addresses both internal and external threats and strongly emphasizes cooperation and autonomy. The EU's security strategy has evolved over time with the aid of several strategic documents. These comprise the Security Strategy in 2003 the Global Strategy in 2016, and the Strategic Compass (SC) in 2022. These documents have been critical in shaping the EU's security and defense policy because they place a strong emphasis on topics like crisis management, regional stability, and citizen protection. The EU's security strategy emphasizes the importance of internal safety and the connection between internal and external aspects of security in addition to addressing external threats. Strategic autonomy, a major idea in the EU's security strategy, refers to the ability of the EU to establish its own priorities for foreign policy, security, and defense. On December 12 and 13, 2003, the first strategic declaration pertaining to the Union's foreign and security policy was agreed. The European Security Strategy's (ESS) tagline was A Secure Europe in a Better World. The leaders of the EU laid forth the goals of its foreign and security policies as well as the strategies for accomplishing them. The statement also mentioned significant challenges to the continent's security, including as terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, regional conflicts, failed nations, and organized crime. Therefore, it wouldn't be astonishing to claim that the dynamics of events in the EU and its near neighborhood swiftly demonstrated the

offered inventory to be insufficient, and that most of the operational approaches taken soon stopped to be applicable to the overall scenario (Willa, 2019: 49–50).

Arguments for updating it or even creating a brand-new, intricate strategy for the EU's interaction with the international community therefore quickly gained traction. Unfortunately, it violated the letter of the document because it wasn't adopted until June 28th, 2016 (European Global Strategy, 2016). Additionally, this is a typical document from the EU in that it is overly general and avoids being categorical or straightforward. Even an exhaustive list of the threats mentioned by the ESS is missing. In a nutshell, it outlines the top priorities for international policy activities, describes the strategies and tactics for carrying out the presumptions that have been adopted, and finally describes the interests of the EU and its citizens. The norms and principles that direct the EU's exterior actions are also described and shown. The ability of the new Strategy to carry out the procedures defining the Union's military strategy is the document's most crucial component (Samadashvili, 2016: 34).

It thus correctly draws a link between internal and external security and holds that internal security is dependent on global stability. As a result, it plans for larger scale external actions to ensure the Union's internal security. The issue of whether its records will result in concrete and quantifiable activities is still up in the air because it solely depends on the member countries' will. Because populists with Euroskeptic attitudes are currently taking over many governments in Union member states, history has shown us that it is not necessarily inevitable (Willa, 2019:50). Furthermore, a change in mindset is required to approach the Union's function as the world's protector of order. The Strategy was followed by important decisions, which has given experts reason for cautious but covert optimism about implementing the Strategy and reviving the CSDP. It was resolved to establish a military planning cell (Military Planning and Conduct Capability, MPCC) during an EU summit in June 2017. The European Defense Fund, funded by the Union's shared arms programs, was formed together with the PESCO system for normal structural cooperation. The policy is subsequently implemented on an economic and international level thanks to a NATO agreement (Willa quoted from Koziez, 2018: 2; Kuzniar, 2018: 65).

The characteristics of the development of a common EU defense policy will be insufficient without examining the new EU foreign and security policy, shared on June 28, 2016, by EU High Commissioner for Foreign and Security Policy F. Mogherini and dubbed EU Global Strategy "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe," or EUGS. The Global Strategy emphasizes the necessity of enhancing the EU's position as a global security provider. A Global Strategy for its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was published by the EU in the summer of 2016. Europeans are urged to take greater responsibility for our security, according to the section titled Security and Defense. We must be capable of recognizing,

responding to, and defending oneself against external threats (Meijer & Wyss, 2019:378).

The EU's strategic defense review must be able to advance the strategy, techniques, and capabilities of the EU defense policy in line with the EU Global Strategy, which sets the goals of the policy in the emerging hybrid-warfare security environment. The EU's policy review for collective security will face many challenges, one of which is figuring out how to improve defense capabilities without duplicating NATO duties. The danger is that, as NATO invests more resources in fortifying its eastern flanks in response to a more assertive Russia, the new EU defense strategy will place more of an emphasis on the southern neighborhood. The EU's eastern neighbors won't be able to implement the ENP required reforms without a strengthened framework of security sector cooperation. Many of them are still resolving frozen conflicts that could unfreeze at any time (Samadashvili, 2016: 34–35).

One of the most obvious contrasts between the EU Global Strategy in 2016 and the European Security Strategy in 2003 is the widespread usage of resilience as a new leitmotif. The word "legislation" was completely absent from the 2003 paper, yet it appears no less than 40 times in the 2016 EU Global Strategy. It places "resilient" above mentions of "human rights" (which are made 31 times), "democratic/democracy/democratization" (which are made 23 times), and "human security" (which are made 4 times). The wave of crises in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan, as well as terrorist acts in Europe, which signaled the end of a relatively extended era of peace and tranquility, were the main causes of such a shift in emphasis (Yakoviyk et.al., 2020:231). The two approaches are related to one another: The guidelines for the European Security Strategy are established by the Global Strategy. According to the European Security Strategy, security is a precondition of development, and then development is a root cause of resilience, respectively. The EU Global Strategy would have us think the same. The development policy also needs to be more in line with our strategic priorities. The resilience category could be interpreted as a call for increased defense spending. In any case, resilience sends a more positive message than fragility does because it is forward-looking and concentrates on finding solutions rather than dwelling on problems (Yakoviyk et.al., 2020:231).

When the EU realized how silly it truly appeared for Europe to rely on US defense, specifically a nuclear umbrella, a new security plan was developed. The only country that spends more on defense than an EU Member State is US. The defense industry and research base in United Europe are ranked second. France, a nuclear power nation, is also a member of the EU (Yakoviyk et.al., 2020:231). It is obvious that only by working together will EU Member States have the capacity to ensure their own security and profoundly alter the course of the globe. The EU Global Strategy for 2016 identified the lack of international defense cooperation as one of its main issues. Consequently, the Strategy promoted progressive

coordination and shared adaptation of national defense planning and capability-building techniques. As the initiative's secretariat, the EDA got to work on creating an annual review process after the EU Council made this claim and approved the concept on November 14, 2016 (Fiott et. al., 2017:46).

The process it initiated led to the initiation of several initiatives on EU defense following the release of the EU Global Strategy in June 2016. The EU, for instance, consented to the creation of a Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and a Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD) for non-executive CSDP military operations. With the help of these initiatives, defense coordination will be improved, and CSDP military actions will be planned and carried out more skillfully. The formation of the European Defense support (EDF), which is the first time in history that the EU would construct a financial instrument to directly support the development of defense capabilities, was added to the list of new projects. As chapter three reveals, this is a significant move (Fiott et. al., 2017:7).

In terms of its worldwide breadth and focal points, the EU worldwide Strategy (EUGS) is a large and ambitious initiative. The EU, however, is unable to provide each component of the EUGS the same length of time. The European Commission created The European Defense Action Plan (EDAP) in December 2016, which was built on the priorities, guiding principles, and interests of the EU as stated in the Strategy. The EU-NATO Joint Declaration, which identifies areas of cooperation, was created with the support of specific actions. The main components of EDAP are new financial mechanisms to help Member States and the European military industry improve their defense capabilities as well as new political goals and challenging tasks for Europeans to take on more responsibility for their security and defense. Contrary to assertions made by certain writers, the European Defense Action Plan will not result in the establishment of a European Army or even the duplication of command structures, as they only exist at the Member State and NATO levels. To increase the production volume and effectiveness of defense investment and to ensure that the defense industries of the EU Member States are more creative and competitive, EDAP's main objective is to foster better defense cooperation (Yakoviyk et.al., 2020:231-32).

The EU's notion of strategic autonomy in the military and security sectors is challenging to put into effect. Several national models of the strategic autonomy of EU Member States in their dealings with the US and a model of strategic partnership with the US exist, which explains why. To avoid relying on the American ally for at least part of its security needs, France creates an independent defense strategy within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. To increase its strategic autonomy, France established the Defense Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB). On the other hand, the UK and the US operate together under a framework of strategic collaboration. The framework for collaboration with the US and other

strong EU Member States was laid out in the strategic autonomy models of Germany and Italy. As a result of Brexit, the Union now confronts additional difficulties in pursuing strategic autonomy in security and defense. In actuality, the UK was one of the few EU countries with a fully functional military and defense industry. Brexit might cause the EU to lose up to 20% of its military capabilities and 40% of its industrial and defense assets. The EU's capacity to affect security and defense, both inside Europe and in neighboring regions, will be significantly impacted by this (Yakoviyk et.al., 2020:234). However, the desire for a Europe that can legitimately protect its citizens also drove governments in EU Member States to act. Blown off the dust from the Lisbon Treaty, several nations began reading the Articles and Protocol on PESCO that they had all collectively approved in 2017, reinforcing its emphasis on the defense of Europe. Some believe PESCO may be the treaty-based mechanism required to improve and raise the standard for EU defense cooperation (Fiott et. al., 2017:11).

### Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 2017

Recent years have seen significant changes to the treaty clauses governing the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), notably between 1997 and 2007. Even more so than the CFSP, the Maastricht Treaty, also known as the Treaty on EU, had several restrictive clauses. Decisions having a defense or military implications were frequently exempted from and susceptible to deviations from the norms and standards of customary policymaking, notably in terms of voting processes. Since the Lisbon Treaty, this exceptionalism has experienced a substantial shift, moving from a set of mostly restraint regulations to one of fundamentally enabling rules, notably those on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which are now being actively used. These modifications emphasize the ambiguous link between language and context, between the obligations imposed by treaties and what the strategic and political environment both within and beyond the EU may or may not permit at any time. Additionally, they once again emphasize the unique position that security and military strategy, hold within the framework of the EU institutions. In addition to the European Defense Fund, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD), the Military Planning and Conduct Capability, and new common funding guarantees for the Battlegroups, the creation of PESCO is a component of a larger initiative to create a European Security and Defense Union (Novaky, 2018:97). Furthermore, it is crucial to ensure that PESCO's protection of CARD and the EDF operates well. Consequently, effective PESCO governance will be crucial. Regular meetings of the relevant Council bodies (PSC, EUMC, and Politico-Military Group) will be conducted in PESCO format, with the PESCO foreign and defense ministers acting as the meeting's key decision-makers (Fiott et. al., 2017:49).

The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) initiative, which the Council approved in late 2017 along

with the Commission's establishment of the European Defense Fund (EDF), is the most ambitious defense initiative the EU has undertaken since the beginning of its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in 1999. Strategic autonomy is required by the EU Global Strategy and may be attained through Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). To put PESCO into action in 2018, a series of quick decisions were taken, including an initial list of 17 projects. The EU Global Strategy, which governs all the EU's foreign policy, previously mentioned strategic autonomy as an objective in June 2016 (Biscop, 2018:191). On December 11th, 2017, the EU implemented PESCO, a hitherto unutilized provision of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Since it was added to the EU's toolset in 2009, PESCO has not been utilized, although having the potential to boost the CSDP of the EU. Because of this, it is sometimes referred to as the Sleeping Beauty of the Lisbon Treaty by the Former President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker (Novaky, 2018:97).

EU governments looked prepared to rouse PESCO from its sleeping beauty, and several of them have subsequently joined PESCO by affixing their signatures to a joint notice. The causes shouldn't be all that shocking. The EU is facing significant security and political challenges because of the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, the numerous terrorist attacks carried out on European soil by different Islamist groups, the ongoing migration crisis, changes in US foreign and defense policy, and the UK's decision to leave the EU. In the summer of 2016, a significant response to these issues began (Fiott et. al., 2017:7). In the statement announcing the launch of PESCO: a long-term goal of PESCO might be to develop a comprehensive force package that complements NATO, which will remain the cornerstone of its members' collective defense (Biscop, 2018:191). PESCO provides a framework for improved defense cooperation between participating member states with the aim of enhancing the EU's defense capabilities and achieving strategic autonomy. It seeks to encourage cooperation, coordination, and joint development of defense capabilities, technologies, and military resources (Leuprecht & Hamilton, 2021:80). PESCO projects range a variety of topics, including cyber defense, crisis response operations, military mobility, and secure communications. To ensure commitment and advancement, PESCO projects are monitored at both the national and EU levels. The major goals of PESCO are to assist the Union's overall security and defense and to improve the EU's capacity to respond to security issues.

The EU has united behind a rise in strategic autonomy in defense to make up for its diminished credibility, the loss of the UK, and the diminishing American security presence in the region. In contrast to past proposals like the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), PESCO aims to strengthen European defense cooperation. Additionally, it builds on the initiatives' efforts to facilitate EU autonomy from NATO, as this desire arose partly



because of how NATO handled the various Yugoslav conflicts (Leuprecht & Hamilton, 2021:81-82).

It offers an enforceable framework for capable and willing EU Member States to cooperate more closely on security and military operations by coordinating efforts to strengthen the deployability and capabilities of soldiers (Novaky, 2018:97-98). When examined more closely, it becomes clear that PESCO differs from earlier agreements that had the same goal of bolstering European defense in terms of benefits and difficulties. To start, EU Member States can choose not to participate in PESCO, which is intended to reduce commitment issues. Second, because there is such a small pool of resources available for this voluntary agreement, PESCO is organized top down and makes use of already existing EU institutions. However, there are drawbacks even though states are not required to commit their own funds and resources. And finally, every PESCO contract that a state chooses to sign is enforceable in court. To guarantee that they are upholding PESCO agreements, each member must submit a National Implementation Plan (NIP) outlining yearly progress (Leuprecht & Hamilton, 2021:82).

In a significant speech delivered just ten days after PESCO was activated at the annual conference of the European Defense Agency (EDA), the High Representative, Federica Mogherini, set an example for others to follow by emphasizing again that PESCO is not intended to create a European Army. PESCO will complement NATO and not infringe upon the Alliance's rights (Biscop, 2018:191). However, the US Pentagon openly stated its objection to the European Defense Fund (EDF) and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in a scathing letter to Federica Mogherini. The letter expresses concern that this operational structure will lead to redundant systems, non-interoperable military hardware, the misuse of scarce defense budget dollars, and unwarranted rivalry between NATO and the EU. How the major power's concerns regarding levels of cooperation and competition and the strategic use of military resources conflict with one another is instructive and insightful. The US needs to strike a balance between its long-held desire for partners to shoulder more of the burden and its goal to avoid unintentionally promoting greater partner military autarky that may weaken the US's influence over its allies (Leuprecht & Hamilton, 2021:79).

PESCO is likely the only way NATO can foresee genuinely major advancements in European capabilities in some of their important fields, notably strategic enablers. Due to this, even if all of Europe's allies invested 2% of their GDP on defense, they would only be able to afford capital-intensive enablers if they pooled their defense expenditures rather than spending 2% of GDP on defense independently. NATO doesn't have a mechanism for such, but PESCO has given the EU one. The Alliance and the Union stand to gain from this (Biscop, 2018:192). There are valid grounds to expect more from PESCO since it differs fundamentally from all previous projects. First off, it is really Member State driven; PESCO would not have been launched if France and Germany had not taken the

initiative and subsequently garnered the backing of the other Member States. Second, it cannot just vanish and stop existing because it has been institutionalized. The National Implementation Plans that Member States are required to create each year will be evaluated by the Council since it is now a component of the EU machinery. Third, as a reward for taking the initiative, the EDF of the Commission enables Member States to obtain co-funding from the EU budget for the first time. Naturally, there is no guarantee that PESCO would uphold its commitments. The Member States have access to the tool; their task now is to use it efficiently. Nevertheless, there's a significant probability it will occur (Biscop, 2018:192).

The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) has the potential to revolutionize defense cooperation within the European Union (EU). If the participating member states uphold their legally binding PESCO commitments, it could assist the Union in achieving strategic autonomy. For this to happen, PESCO's implementation must be closely supervised at both the national and EU levels. There should be consequences for those member states that do not uphold their obligations. If not, PESCO will become yet another much-awaited EU security and military initiative that fails to live up to expectations, just like Battlegroups ultimately depend on political will (Novaky, 2018:97-98, 103).

#### **EU's Strategic Compass in 2022**

The Strategic Compass of the European Union is a framework created to guide and bolster the EU's security and military operations. With the goal of acting as a development roadmap for the EU's goals in terms of security and defense, it was agreed in March 2022. It aspires to strengthen the EU's military policy while advancing world peace and security. Several security-related topics are covered in The Strategic Compass, including military aggression, state terrorism, and natural disasters. It includes detailed suggestions and timeframes for the upcoming five to 10 years, acting as a blueprint for action. The Strategic Compass' adoption reflects the evolution of Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU and how that shift has impacted the dynamics of EU security and defense. Additionally, it influences the cooperation between the EU and Ukraine as well as the bolstering of transatlantic and international security.

The Strategic Compass, a significant document approved in March 2022, outlines the security and defense strategy for the EU for the ensuing ten years. It serves as a road map for the advancement of the EU's security and defense ambitions, building on earlier strategic documents like the Global Strategy in 2016 and the Security Strategy in 2003. With the introduction of the European Security Strategy in 2003, a determined attempt was made to provide the security instruments required for Europe to begin standing on its own two feet. Although ambitious, the project ultimately turned out to be beyond the Union's current capabilities. The European Union's Global Strategy presented a second chance in 2016. Given

the misguided lesson of the 2003 Strategy, a more cautious effort is made to establish a security foundation for the Union. Security cannot be attained by relying only on oneself, as the document's title suggests, but rather calls for a global strategy. Even the harshest EU critics agreed that the 2016 Strategy had undergone significant revisions, making it more likely to be successful. To give it even more strength, the 2020 European Commission Security Union Strategy and the Defense and Space Packages, both of which were unveiled by the same European Commission in February 2022, were introduced (Branda, 2022:237).

The EU's security and defense programs benefit from the Strategic Compass' (SC) analysis of the strategic environment and efforts to improve the EU's cohesiveness and sense of direction. The SC highlights the need to gradually improve the EU's civilian and military command and control structures as well as the need to make sure that the Military Planning and Conduct Capability is fully capable of planning, directing, and overseeing both non-executive and executive activities and operations. The SC also states that once EU Battlegroups reach their maximum operational level, they will be under the command and direction of a designated national operational Headquarters or an EU Military Planning and Behavior Capability operating inside the ERDC framework (Tulun, 2022:2).

The Strategic Compass aims to create a framework for managing and enhancing EU security and defense capabilities. The document emphasizes the need for a comprehensive and integrated approach to security, acknowledging that threats to the EU can be military, hybrid, or non-military in nature. Topics like crisis management, resilience, capability development, and strategic autonomy are given a lot of attention. Additionally, the Strategic Compass aims to strengthen the EU's position as a significant player in global security and defense by highlighting the importance of collaboration and partnerships, both within the EU and with other international actors. The Strategic Compass, taken as a whole, is an essential document that guides the EU's strategy for security and defense with the goal of strengthening the EU's ability to handle current and upcoming security challenges and protect its citizens. The Strategic Compass discusses international security in terms of location. It does, however, give bordering countries a lot of attention, highlighting their special significance to the EU. More specifically, it calls for an expansion of the EU and NATO's political and military cooperation. The Strategic Compass doesn't seek to replace NATO or make it less effective. Instead, the document repeatedly emphasizes that by putting it into action, the EU will become a more valuable partner for NATO and the US. The document is supported by several significant announcements for increased defense spending, especially considering Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This suggests to the US that the EU will take extra measures to ensure its own security. (Atlamazoğlu & Moyer, 2022).

The Russian invasion of Ukraine damaged the peace in Europe and changed its security environment. EU foreign, security, and defense policy must adjust adequately. On February 24, 2022, Russia began a military operation of unreasonable and unlawful aggression against Ukraine. In 2014, it annexed Crimea, supported the pro-Russian separatists in control of some areas of the Donbas, and engaged in hybrid warfare with Ukraine. In addition to subjugating Ukraine, the attack seeks to destroy democracy in Europe and change the overall security system. In response, the EU has given Ukraine comprehensive support, including military aid. Furthermore, it has imposed severe sanctions on Russia and is modifying its diplomatic, security, and defense policies to reflect the new reality (Przetacznik, 2022).

The Versailles Declaration, issued by EU leaders on March 10-11, 2022, reaffirmed the EU's resolve to "take more responsibility for its own security" and strengthen its "capacity to act autonomously" while recognizing the value of cooperation between the EU and NATO. By increasing their defense spending, cooperating on projects, such as joint procurement, investing in military capabilities, such as strategic enablers, enhancing research and innovation synergies, and growing the EU's defense industry, the EU Member States committed to investing more in defense capabilities and cutting-edge technologies. The EU leaders approved the Strategic Compass, "an ambitious plan of action for bolstering the EU's security and defense strategy by 2030," on March 21. The Strategic Compass identifies Russia's assault against Ukraine as a "major geopolitical shift" that imperils EU interests. To achieve a "quantum leap forward" in security and defense, increase the EU's capability and willingness to act, strengthen its resilience, and ensure solidarity and mutual defense, it commits the EU-27 to investing in and developing defense capabilities, collaborating with partners, crisis management, and enhancing resilience (Przetacznik, 2022).

EU member states and institutions are now more concerned about defense following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. However, NATO and the US remain crucial to Europe's security. Significant advancements targeted at enhancing European defense capabilities have been driven by Russia's war in Ukraine. Ukraine's potential to revolutionize EU defense, though, depends on point of view. On the one hand, it is evident that EU leaders concur on the necessity to reevaluate the Union's security and defense capabilities and budget to become more strategically autonomous. In this regard, the European Peace Facility (EPF) is a crucial tool that is now aiding Ukraine and enabling the EU to pay member states back for contributed munitions from existing inventories. The EPF is not included in the EU budget. The EU's political identity as a defense actor will be affected by this, as well as whether it will become a structural commitment in the bloc's budget (Csernaton, 2023). Without a comprehensive plan for the European defense industry and without it being put into action, the money coming from the EU budget just drives up costs rather than

expanding industry capacity and military capabilities (Ehl, 2023). If the US decided to stop playing the major military support role for Ukraine after the presidential election in November 2024, it might represent a turning point. The EU's institutions and member states would need to significantly up their level of military assistance to make up for a less assertive US (Heisbourg, 2023).

If the war continues, the European Union will be fragile, damaged, and unstable. Additionally, it won't be able to cope with the immense challenges made worse by Russia's invasions of Ukraine in 2022. It has made Europe more and more dependent on the US for supporting in Ukraine. Furthermore, it has not yet developed a strategic perspective based on security and physical power. In 2024, it won't matter who is elected as the next president of the United States since Europe won't have a powerful and integrated security system (Dempsy, 2023).

### **Current Debates About European Army**

The idea of European Army gained popularity in the 2000s for a variety of reasons. It is important to ask the question that; despite the several initiatives in security and defense what the reason was to dream about a European Army and what the actual motivation behind that idea is. An important turning point in the political development of Europe was seen as the perforation of national states by immigration, integration, and trade, necessitating the need for improved security and defense capabilities. The need for a European Army to ensure security on the continent was also influenced by the deteriorating ties between Russia and the EU following the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 (Cross & Karolewski, 2021). The unwillingness of member states to cede sovereignty as well as different values and security goals, however, were barriers to integration in defense policy (Angelucci & Isernia, 2019). Overall, the desire for a European Army in the 2000s was influenced by geopolitical changes, shifting social dynamics, and the need for a European security system.

However there have been discussions and disagreements about the concept of a European Army. While some contend that a European Army could improve European nations' security and defense capacities (Gülmez & Gülmez, 2020) but some argue that the European Army is a utopic idea and even a counterproductive project. The notion of a European Army has been regularly debated at the highest levels of the EU. Emmanuel Macron, Former President of the French Republic, stated on November 6, 2018, that we won't be able to protect the Europeans if we don't decide to build a truly European Army. Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated on November 12 that we must create a plan for eventually forming a truly European Army. However, former Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces General Pierre de Villiers asserts that the European Army is a dream, which could turn out to be a nightmare (Le Gleut & Conway-Mouret, 2019:90). Overall, the creation of

a European Army is a complicated issue that needs to be carefully considered from a variety of perspectives.

The idea of building a European Army was first put forth by Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the leaders of the "Visegrad Four" (V4) countries of Central Europe on August 26, 2016, and it was a far cry from the more modest proposal of enhancing European defense cooperation and capability. Given Poland's dedication to NATO and transatlantic ties, which are frequently used as justifications to oppose further EU integration, it is surprising that Poland was a part of the initiative (Oxford Analytica, 2016). In terms of threat perceptions, capabilities, and defining a shared hierarchy of security challenges, there are obstacles and differences among European countries (Meijer & Wyss, 2019). Concerns are also raised regarding the impact on NATO and transatlantic relations. To modernize and integrate European defense companies, organizations like the European Defense Fund and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD) were established. The primary goal of these initiatives is to strengthen the European defense industry and provide it with the latest technologies (Ciupiński, 2023). The CARD will be put through its paces at the end of 2017, and the Agency is tasked with informing the EU defense ministers of the results every two years. The defense review will provide a better EU level perspective of matters including defense budget and national investment as well as defense research activities, according to the Council's findings from March 6, 2017. However, it won't be a tool for enforcing punishment or taking control of national defense expenditure plans (Fiott et. al., 2017:46).

### **Possible "Pros" and "Cons" of the Creation of European Army**

Several members of EU have expressed support for the concept of a European Army. France has long been a vocal supporter of the development of a European Army, as evidenced by its participation in the proposal for a European Defense Community. As evidenced by German officials' involvement in programs like Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defense Fund, Germany has also expressed support for increased defense cooperation within the EU. However, it is significant to note that member states' levels of support for a European Army may differ, and there may be varying opinions and concerns about the creation of such a military force. Firstly, one of the possible advantages would be enhanced security that a European Army may enhance the defense capacities of European nations, providing a framework for collective security. Secondly, greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness in defense operations may result from consolidating military capabilities and resources. Thirdly, the promotion of unity and solidarity among European nations could be facilitated by a European Army. Moreover, a competitive European defense industry might emerge because of the creation of a European Army. Besides the advantages also

possible disadvantages must be revealed. Here we must start with the sovereignty issue that it may be contentious for member states to give up some control over their defense strategies to establish a European Army. Secondly some problems may arise because of the different threat perceptions. It is difficult to define a common hierarchy of security challenges in Europe because each country has a different perception of threats and security goals. Third as one of the most important one is about the impact on NATO. Potentially affecting NATO's role and relevance, the creation of a European Army could also exacerbate transatlantic tensions. Lastly strong political will and coordination would be necessary to establish a European Army.

The development of national identity and solidarity has traditionally been significantly influenced by the army. The exclusive use of force is the defining characteristic of sustainable state-building. More than any other institution, the armed forces serve as a symbol of the relationship between the state and its citizens as well as the state. National governments deliberately impede the progress of military-political integration because of fear that their sovereignty would be lost if a European Army and united defense policy are developed (Yakoviyk et.al. 2020:227).

However, some argue that we are far from having a highly developed European Army, which is a rational goal that is impossible to achieve even in the long term and is not likely to happen anytime soon. Whose instructions would such a European Army follow? What moral standards would it uphold? Would Europeans be prepared to risk their lives to join such an army? Given the divides within the EU, might it not run the risk of producing an organization that would be more bureaucratic than effective? Avoiding terms like European Army, which are viewed as troubling abroad. All Europeans who value their national sovereignty are wary of the essentially federalist concept of a European Army. Beyond that, though, these terms raise issues because they fuel worries that the protection offered by NATO, which is believed to be effective, may gradually be replaced by a system that is still poorly defined, as well as worries that American disengagement in a virtual sense may ultimately lead to American disengagement in a real sense (Le Gleut & Conway-Mouret, 2019:91).

Though premature and unwise, expecting a European Army in the upcoming decades is preferable than the idea that one would never exist. Just as Schuman said in 1950 that Europe would not be formed all at once or according to a single blueprint, the basis of a European Army will be gradual achievements and developing solidarity among its members. Through these forward-thinking areas of cooperation, the EU will be able to act decisively and handle the new security and military issues facing the Union (Avezou, 2021).

Some argue that it can be counterproductive to use a European Army because the idea has become toxic in many quarters. An initiative may encounter resistance that it wouldn't otherwise encounter if it were presented

as a step towards a European Army. Particularly when the European Commission and its former President Jean-Claude Juncker discuss a European Army, it tends to exacerbate the negativity of those who were already Eurosceptic. It is crucial that the EU and NATO do not make demands on those forces that are contradictory or incompatible since there is only one set of forces that are available to Member States. It is also important to avoid duplicating jobs and organizational structures due to the restricted resources. These have been the EU's defense policy ever since the CSDP was established. It's also important to control expectations. Both the EU and NATO have made significant defense declarations in the past amid much enthusiasm, only to have them quietly cease without having any significant impact. Therefore, it makes sense that many people today are skeptical of PESCO, yet another defense initiative. Some people, however, have expectations that may be a little over the top and overly enthusiastic. Before the Member States significantly increase their military capability and attain a high level of strategic autonomy through PESCO and the EDF, it will take some time (Biscop, 2018:191).

Since NATO's establishment, it's possible that European nations have relied too much on the US for their own protection. While European nations fall short of the statutory requirement, the US meets about 70% of the annual defense bill for all NATO members. Europe cannot continue to rely only on America for security, as shown by the last American government and the current political upheaval. Senior administration officials received a warning from the US's Former President Trump in 2018 that he would remove the US from NATO, leaving Europe in a vulnerable situation with Russia. The amount of money that several allies were spending on defense displeased Trump. (Avezou, 2021). In early June 2020, Former US President Donald Trump announced intentions to remove some of US' troops from Germany, cutting the nation's military presence there by 30%. In the opinion of the US, Germany and much of Europe have lost their credibility as allies in defense strategy due to their insufficient financial contribution for NATO. According to Europe, Trump's assaults endanger the alliance's cohesion (Bochert, 2020). President Biden underlined NATO's importance and need for American security and stability, but Trump's remarks should serve as a wake-up call for Europeans to recognize their own defense-related responsibilities. Given that Russia regularly conducts deadly military maneuvers on its western border, the potential US withdrawal from NATO would have been devastating for European security (Avezou, 2021).

The political leaders of the EU are under pressure to find new methods of ensuring the security of the continent because of Trump's criticism of NATO from the west and Russian military activities in Ukraine putting Europe's security in danger from the east. The days of being able to depend on others without hesitation are gone, according to Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Therefore, if we Europeans want to remain a cohesive group, we must decide our own fate. Trump's

decision to withdraw some part of US troops from Germany may encourage the EU to develop its own military strategy even though his goal is to strengthen NATO by requiring that each member contribute an equal amount of money. Trump's pressure may advance the kind of military fusion in Europe that has long been advocated but never fully realized (Bochert, 2020).

The EU continues to be a target of hybrid warfare, terrorism, cyber threats, and other problems even while the chance of dynamic wars in Europe is low. The EU and its members are simultaneously facing dangers that are more diverse than ever. The EU cannot continue to be as significant as it is on the global stage as threats multiply and get more complex if it only relies on its soft power. 2018 saw the inauguration of Emmanuel Macron, who declared that for Europe to defend itself more effectively on its own, a truly European Army was necessary. But what exactly does the term European Army mean? Would the EU control the military on a supranational level, as the EDC suggested, or would it be a pan-European military with national components? Many Europeans may find the idea of an EU army unsettling because they may view it as a further erosion of national sovereignty and want to maintain the national prerogative on matters of defense and security. Brexit or efforts by the Hungarian government to marginalize some of their most disadvantaged groups show that the desire for more national authority over a range of sectors inside the EU is a recurrent problem (Avezou, 2021).

An EU army would be opposed by eight of the twenty-seven EU countries, according to 2017 Eurobarometer research. However, 68% of Europeans believe that the EU should take a more active role in matters of security and defense. According to the Standard Eurobarometer survey, taken between 18 January and 14 February 2022, 77% of Europeans are in favor of a wide shared defense and security policy, with majorities in favor of such a policy in each Member State. Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel said, "We have to work on the vision of one day creating a proper European Army" in November of last year. This vision demonstrates how the creation of a European Army may in fact result in greater defense-related collaboration and solidarity amongst European nations. In that perspective, a larger European Army would support NATO's role as a security supplier by reinforcing European defense (Avezou, 2021).

The aspirations of Europe for a common defense may be doomed by external pressures from global actors. The EU has been working hard to build up its military capabilities, but the US has been particularly resistant out of concern that this might reduce US influence over regional military choices. A united European defense community could exclude US defense contractors, which is another reason why the US is afraid of European military integration. Kay Bailey Hutchison, the Former US ambassador to NATO, acknowledges they do not want this to be a protectionist vehicle for the EU. They want Europeans to be capable and powerful, but we don't want them to barricade themselves off from US goods. The US

has long opposed deep military integration in Europe, whether directly or through aggressive lobbying in the European Parliament (Bochert, 2020).

The European External Action Service (EEAS), which serves as the EU's diplomatic presence abroad, was developed because of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) that the EU adopted. The EU can take part in and direct operations for crisis management and peacekeeping thanks to the CSDP and EEAS. Despite being a promising beginning, these factors do not make the EU a potent security supplier. The EU has 27 brains and 1 arm without a clear sense of European strategic autonomy. When all the EU's members are considered, the EU ranks third in terms of global military spending, behind only the US and China. The EU wastes an estimated €26.4 billion yearly because of duplication, overcapacity, and procurement restrictions for defense. They could all save time and money if the European military were to be more integrated, for example by establishing a standard certification process for ammunition. Spending more prudently and cooperatively would therefore be the first step toward the creation of a European Army (Avezou, 2021).

However, it is still unclear that what should be the EU's military role. Member states have different viewpoints on the subject and NATO is already responsible for ensuring European security. In this context what EU must do to strengthen its military capabilities without offending its neighbors in Brussels? There is a chance for the EU to provide a significant military contribution during severe emergencies that are below NATO's Article 5 threshold (Braw, 2022).

The possibility of establishing a European sovereignty in defense has been the subject of active discussion between Europeans and the US during discussions on the strategic autonomy initiative for the EU. Even though it is widely acknowledged that the term "European Army" is one of the most inaccurate because it is frequently used to refer to the process of fully federalizing Europe, analytical reviews on this topic dominate the research due to the arbitrarily long time since the beginning of strategic independence and the degree of ambiguity related to its origins. It is challenging to explain EU defense policy. However, ineffective communication by the institutions based in Brussels helps Eurosceptics and jeopardizes public confidence in union policy. There is no phrase more destructive or deceptive than "European Army" in particular. Plans by the EU to bolster defense strategy will not result in the formation of a unified European Army or an international military alliance. Even a true defense policy cannot be the EU's. The EU does not, like NATO, defend its territory from invasions by other nations. Instead, the part of EU international security policies that deals with the military is generally referred to as defense policy in the EU (Keohane, 2016).

Member States of the EU should concentrate on fostering more trust and collaboration inside NATO as they lack the ability or will to pursue a single policy. To build an army there is a need in coordination and leadership skills. EU nations that debate every political

choice are unable to lead in the manner desired by such an organization. They may believe they have a good understanding of how to coordinate their separate military, but this is only possible because of the established American leadership and organizational framework in NATO. (Özkızılcık, 2021).

As they lack the capacity or desire to pursue a common agenda, Member States of the EU should focus on developing greater confidence and cooperation within NATO. Despite claims to the contrary made by representatives of European governments, the transatlantic cooperation is not being strengthened by this search for autonomy. The alliance is not strengthened by the concept of a European force; on the contrary, it loses importance. The most often discussed issues here include the expansion of the defense budget, the role of European countries within NATO, military capabilities, and strategies for alleviating the burden on the US military inside NATO. If the objective was to boost cooperation and become a trustworthy and valuable ally to the US. The transatlantic alliance is currently being criticized in a discussion throughout Europe.

Despite what EU and French leaders have maintained, a European Army is not a workable answer. The EU would lack the requisite resources, capacities, knowledge, and public support even if it were to effectively bridge the substantial gaps between its member states, which would be a massive endeavor.

#### **Motivations of Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel About the European Army**

In line with the larger objective of European integration, which has been a cornerstone of the EU project, support for a European Army is appropriate. In November 2018, Macron and Merkel assessed a united European Army. A shared military force and a common defense policy are seen by France and Germany as essential steps towards fostering greater integration and cohesion among EU Member States. They hope to foster trust, foster solidarity, and strengthen the ties that bind the EU together by cooperating on defense issues. The fact that France and Germany are in favor of establishing a European Army demonstrates their shared goals of improving defense cooperation, reducing reliance on outside parties, and fostering strategic autonomy for the EU. Both nations seek to increase Europe's defense capacity, promote greater integration, and guarantee the protection of European interests by promoting the creation of a European Army. But to make a European Army a reality, EU Member States must continue to uphold their commitment to unity and cooperation while navigating obstacles and concerns.

In addition, establishing a European Army is viewed to lessen Europe's reliance on external actors, like the US, for its defense requirements. The goal of France and Germany is to lessen reliance on NATO and increase Europe's strategic autonomy. In terms of defense and security, they picture a Europe that can act on its own, defending its own

interests and taking a more active part in world affairs. The French government's support for a European Army is consistent with its larger security plan for the twenty-first century, which emphasizes the need for a powerful and independent European defense capability.

Macron's plan for a European Army has gained support, but it also has issues and limitations. Some of the issues raised include the concern over national sovereignty and the potential impact on current defense infrastructure in member states. Furthermore, it may be difficult to agree on the creation and operation of a European Army due to the disparate interests and priorities of EU Member States. Moreover, the establishment of a European Army will necessitate careful consideration of several factors, such as political will, cooperation among member states, and the capacity to address issues pertaining to national sovereignty and existing defense structures.

Despite taking part in the NATO and EU expansion in the years that followed, France never released any documents outlining its security strategy. France did not start creating comprehensive texts outlining its military and national security strategy until the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, when Europe and the rest of the world found themselves in the process of rebuilding the international order. The first report, which was published in 2006, covered France's stance on this pervasive issue as it emerged as the biggest danger to the nation. Then, in 2017, the Strategic Review of Defense and National Security was released, after the publication of White Papers on Defense and National Security in 2008 and 2013, respectively. These publications describe France's security goals, methods for accomplishing them, obstacles, and dangers. They contribute to a thorough knowledge of both global security and security on a local, social, and individual level. In their programming, they advocate for France as a European and world force (Zieba, 2022:3).

France, as expressed by Macron, wants to maintain its complete position of sovereignty, and believes that it is important to protect our sovereignty over the future. In that case, many other Member States agree with France. The encouragement of multilateralism, the formation of strategic alliances, and the pursuit of European autonomy should coexist with the desire for sovereignty. Building European strategic autonomy while preserving national sovereignty is not at all adversarial, notwithstanding the opinions of several Heads of State, notably the President of France (Yakoviyk et.al., 2020:230).

To create a European force, France has often stated its ambition. But Paris is particularly interested in seeing Europe break away from the US; this is because France's objective is to have Europe become more reliant on France and less on the US, Paris has used the political tensions over maritime boundaries between Greece and Türkiye to further its neo-Napoleonic objectives. Because of its desire for a European Army, more independence from the US, and defense of Russian expansionism, it has been questioned if France is a Trojan Horse within NATO (Özkızılcık, 2021).

Macron never intended to suggest that the EU should somehow displace NATO, nor did he ever seriously push for a European Army to defend Europe from the US. He did assert that for Europe to be able to defend itself against security threats, it needed to become more independent from Washington. Additionally, he did mention the US as a potential source of cyberattacks against Europe during that same address, particularly considering prior American cybersecurity operations that had intercepted private talks between European leaders, including Merkel (Brattberg and Valasek, 2019: 14).

Merkel's goal of fostering defense cooperation among EU Member States, reducing reliance on outside actors, and fostering strategic autonomy is what motivates her to create a European Army. The desire to improve defense cooperation among EU Member States is one of the primary drivers behind Merkel's support for a European Army. Merkel thinks that a single European defense force would promote improved interoperability, effectiveness, and cost-effectiveness in dealing with shared security challenges. A European Army could improve Europe's collective defense capabilities and contribute to a more secure and stable continent by pooling resources and expertise. The pursuit of strategic autonomy is another motivation behind Merkel's support for a European Army. She sees a Europe that is less dependent on external actors, like the US, for its defense requirements. Europe can assert its independence and take a more active part in determining its security environment by enhancing its own defense capabilities. Merkel believes that a European Army would help to lessen Europe's reliance on NATO and increase the EU's capacity to act independently in matters of security and defense. The larger objective of European integration is consistent with Merkel's proposal for a European Army. According to her, a unified military strategy and common defense policy would strengthen the EU Member States' sense of cohesion and advance the integration process. European nations can foster solidarity, trust, and the ties that bind the EU together by cooperating on defense issues. Merkel's plan for a European Army has gained support, but it also has issues and limitations. Some of the issues raised include the concern over national sovereignty and the potential impact on current defense infrastructure in member states. Furthermore, it might be difficult to come to an agreement on the creation and operation of a European Army due to the disparate interests and priorities of EU Member States. To advance with this ambitious project, Merkel's strategy involves navigating these complexities and identifying areas where member states can agree.

### **Viewpoint of US Concerning the European Army**

Historically, the US has been a steadfast supporter of NATO and has emphasized the significance of transatlantic defense cooperation. While the US acknowledges the EU's efforts to strengthen its defenses, there are differing opinions on whether the EU should establish an army. The US perspective considers the potential impact on

transatlantic cooperation. The US has expressed worry that the creation of a European Army could duplicate NATO's efforts and potentially weaken the alliance's cohesion. The US emphasizes the significance of NATO as the primary structure for European collective defense and supports continued cooperation within this existing framework. The US viewpoint includes the requirement for NATO and the EU to have complementary capabilities. Instead of duplicate or compete with NATO's efforts, the US encourages the EU to concentrate on developing capabilities that support and strengthen them. Utilizing resources effectively and preventing needless extraneous effort are the goals of this strategy. The US has repeatedly urged greater burden sharing among NATO members. According to the US, establishing a European Army might help ensure that Europe's defense responsibilities are distributed more fairly. By constructing their own defense capabilities, EU Member States could reduce some of the burden on the US and contribute more proportionately to group defense efforts.

The development of a European Army continues to be controversial in the eyes of the US. While acknowledging the EU's desire for improved defense capabilities, the US stresses the significance of maintaining transatlantic unity, making sure that capabilities are complementary, and encouraging burden sharing within the confines of the current NATO framework. The US point of view emphasizes how important it is for the EU and NATO to continue working together and coordinating to effectively address shared security challenges. The military might of the US and the NATO alliance has been essential to Europe's defense since the end of World War II. Considering growing challenges, European leaders are now seriously debating a future in which they undertake their own military operations. Although the necessity for European military independence from the US has been discussed for years, the US decision to withdraw from Afghanistan has forced states and non-state armed groups to reassess their reliance on the US.

Regarding the emergence of a more independent European defense identity outside of NATO, the US has expressed a variety of worries. Over the past ten years, CSDP has largely been viewed with skepticism and apathy in America. Washington continues to view European defense through the lens of purely transatlantic security, with NATO as its pillar. Most current American attitudes are the consequence of decisions made by prior administrations, but the Trump administration has a particularly unfavorable opinion of EU defense that is influenced by its larger Euroscepticism. In contrast to previous US administrations that tended to support most European integration's initiatives, the Trump administration is ideologically inclined to view the EU as a supranational organization that restricts the national sovereignty of its member states and is an economic competitor to the U.S. (Brattberg and Valasek, 2019: 14).

This argument has been influenced by some of the terminology that European authorities regularly employ when describing their military policy. The use of phrases

like “strategic autonomy,” “European Army,” and “sovereignty” carries the risk of giving certain American officials the idea that new EU military initiatives are an attempt to minimize the role of NATO in guaranteeing European security or are purely a response to Trump. Many Atlanticists in Washington who are usually dedicated to keeping the US engaged in NATO are dissatisfied with the idea of strategic autonomy because it fits into a political narrative of unappreciative Europeans attempting to distance themselves from the US. Worst-case scenario: Isolationist and Euroskeptical inclinations in Washington may be aided by American politicians’ ignorance of the intricacies of European defense discourse. A lesson can be learned from Trump’s furious retort to Macron’s comments on a European Army before the 100th anniversary of World War I in France in November 2018. Because Trump perceived his French opponent’s statements as a danger to himself, he responded aggressively to him (Brattberg and Valasek, 2019: 14-15).

With a unified military, Europe would finally be able to defend itself effectively without requiring outside assistance. It would be sufficient to simply coordinate efforts and broaden the European Defense Agency’s mandate. Importantly, none of that would call for the ceding of national military sovereignty, and member states could save money if they invested jointly in European industrial defense projects and had coherent individual defense spending plans. There are plenty of reasons to integrate the military and plenty of solutions for doing so, the only thing lacking is political will. By providing military support, the US lulled European leaders into a false sense of security and made the task of creating a European Army seem insurmountable. The EU’s development of its own military strategy may now be influenced by Trump’s decision to withdraw some of the troops from Germany. The perception that North American and European international security interests are mutually exclusive has obscured the potential of a united European front. The future of Europe depends on placing the issue of increased military integration at the top of the political agenda for the continent (Bochert, 2020).

## **Conclusion**

As we’ve already stated the idea of a European Army has generated a lot of debate. While some claim that a European Army might strengthen the security and military capabilities of European states, others claim that the proposal is unrealistic and perhaps a waste of time. There are barriers and variations across European nations in terms of threat perceptions, capabilities, and identifying a shared hierarchy of security issues. Concerns about the effect on NATO and transatlantic ties are also voiced.

The development of a European Army may, however, should be met with various amounts of support from member states as well as differing perspectives and concerns. First, a European Army may improve the

military capabilities of European states, creating a framework for collective security. This is one of the potential benefits. Secondly, by combining military skills and resources, defensive operations may become more effective and efficient. Third, a European Army may make it easier to promote solidarity and cooperation among European states. Furthermore, the development of a European Army may lead to the emergence of a competitive European defense industry.

Along with the benefits, potential drawbacks must also be disclosed. To form a European Army, member states may be reluctant to give up part of their influence over their military policies. This sovereignty problem must be addressed first. Second, varied danger perceptions might lead to certain issues. Because each nation in Europe views threats and security objectives differently, it is challenging to establish a consistent hierarchy of security issues. The influence on NATO ranks third as one of the most significant. The development of a European Army may potentially change NATO’s function and significance and may heighten transatlantic tensions. Finally, creating a European force would require significant political cooperation and will.

Some claim that because the notion has proven controversial in many lines, using a European Army may be harmful. If a project is framed as a step toward a European Army, it may face opposition that it wouldn’t otherwise face. Since there is only one set of forces that are accessible to Member States, it is imperative that the EU and NATO do not place demands on those forces that are incongruous or incompatible.

Different member nations have different opinions, and NATO is already in charge of maintaining European security. During grave circumstances that fall below NATO’s Article 5 threshold, the EU may be able to make a considerable military commitment.

One of the key motivations behind the push for a European Army is the desire for strategic autonomy. As Macron believes that Europe should be able to act independently in areas of defense and security rather than exclusively relying on the US or NATO. By establishing a European Army, Macron hopes to improve Europe’s capacity to manage security crises and protect its interests both domestically and abroad.

Member States of the EU should concentrate on promoting greater cooperation and trust within NATO since they lack the resources or will to pursue a unified strategy. Coordination and leadership abilities are needed to establish an army. EU countries that discuss every political decision are unable to lead in the way that such an organization wants. They may think they are adept at coordinating the activities of their various armed forces, but this is only feasible due to the established American leadership and institutional structure in NATO.

In the past, the US has consistently backed NATO and underlined the value of transatlantic defense cooperation. The US recognizes the EU’s attempts to bolster its defenses, but there are conflicting views on whether the EU needs to create an army. The US viewpoint considers



how it may affect transatlantic cooperation. The development of a European Army has alarmed the US, which fears that it may duplicate NATO's efforts and compromise the cohesiveness of the alliance. The US underscores NATO's importance as the main framework for European collective defense and encourages sustained cooperation within this framework. According to the US perspective, NATO and the EU must have complementing capacities. The US wants the EU to concentrate on creating capabilities that support and improve NATO's efforts rather than duplicating or competing with them. This strategy's objectives are to effectively use resources and avoid wasting time or effort on unneeded activities. The US has advocated for more burden sharing among NATO members on several occasions. The US claims that creating a European Army might contribute to a more equitable distribution of defense duties in Europe. EU Member States may lessen the load on the US and contribute more fairly to collective security efforts by building their own defense capabilities.

The US still views the creation of a European Army as contentious. The US emphasizes the need of sustaining transatlantic unity, ensuring that capabilities are complimentary, and supporting burden sharing within the boundaries of the present NATO structure while accepting the EU's desire for greater military capabilities. The US viewpoint underscores how crucial it is for NATO and the EU to keep coordinating and cooperating to successfully solve common security problems.

A few of the terms that European authorities frequently use to describe their military strategy have affected this debate. The use of terms like strategic autonomy, European Army, and sovereignty runs the danger of leading some American officials to believe that new EU military activities are an effort to downplay the importance of NATO in ensuring European security or are only a response to Trump. Because the concept of strategic autonomy fits into a political narrative of unappreciative Europeans trying to separate themselves from the US.

EU Member States have claimed that they do not wish to relinquish their military sovereignty for more than 70 years to undertake haphazard integration programs. By offering military assistance, the US deceived European politicians into believing they were secure and made the job of building a European Army appear impossible. The possibility of a unified European front has been hidden by the belief that North American and European foreign security objectives are mutually incompatible. The problem of greater military unity must be prioritized politically for the continent if Europe is to have a bright future.

If the dream of European Army comes true it is supposed that Europe would finally be able to defend itself successfully without seeking outside aid with a united military. There are several justifications for and ways to integrating the military; all that is required is political will. The issue arises because a European Army will be a specialized force protecting specific European

interests but here an important question arises: what are the interests of Europe and who defines them?

### **Extended Abstract**

It's important to keep in mind that the CSDP has considerably expanded the likelihood of greater European independence in foreign policy and, consequently, defense, even though its tools did not correspond to a permanent army. The CSDP agreement set the stage for several further developments, such as the requirement for quick-reaction forces and transnational EU Battlegroups supervised by the European Defense Agency (EDA), which was established in 2004. In addition to giving EU-led military operations access to NATO resources and planning expertise, the Berlin Plus Agreement stressed ESDP's objective of once again concluding the existing transatlantic security framework.

These have been the EU's defense strategies ever since the CSDP was established. Controlling expectations is also essential. Both the EU and NATO have made significant defense commitments in the past with a lot of passion, only for those promises to cease quietly without having any real impact. There is good cause for society's broad suspicion about PESCO, yet another defense initiative. However, some people could have inflated hopes or be overexcited. Through PESCO and the EDF, it will take some time before the Member States significantly increase their military prowess and achieve a high level of strategic autonomy.

A new security and defense effort known as ESS was launched at the start of the 2000s. A flexible framework that directs the EU's approach to security and defense is known as the Security Strategy (ESS). It confronts dangers from both within and beyond and places a high emphasis on autonomy and collaboration. A variety of strategic papers have helped the EU's security strategy change over time. These include the Security Strategy in 2003, the Global Strategy in 2016 and the Strategic Compass (SC) in 2022. Because they place such a heavy focus on issues like crisis management, regional stability, and citizen protection, these papers have played a crucial role in determining the security and defense strategy of the EU. In addition to combating external threats, the EU's security policy highlights the significance of internal security and the relationship between internal and exterior components of security. The capacity of the EU to determine its own objectives for foreign policy, security, and defense is referred to as strategic autonomy, a key concept in the EU's security strategy. The idea of European Army gained popularity in the 2000s for a variety of reasons. It is important to ask the question that; despite the several initiatives in security and defense what the reason was to dream about a European Army and also what the actual motivation behind that idea is. An important turning point in the political development of Europe was seen as the perforation of national states by immigration, integration, and trade, necessitating the need for improved security and defense capabilities.

Some contend that a European Army may improve the security and military capabilities of European nations, while others argue that the idea is unachievable and even a waste of time. Regarding threat perceptions, capabilities, and the identification of a common hierarchy of security challenges, there exist impediments and differences across European countries. Also raised are worries about the impact on NATO and the transatlantic relationship. The US has continuously endorsed NATO and emphasized the need of transatlantic defense cooperation in the past. The US acknowledges the EU's efforts to strengthen its defenses, but there are differing opinions on whether the EU should build an army. According to the US perspective, it may have an impact on transatlantic collaboration. The creation of a European Army has disturbed the US, which is concerned that it may duplicate NATO's efforts and jeopardize the alliance's cohesion. The US emphasizes NATO's significance as the primary structure for European collective defense and supports continued cooperation within this structure. NATO and the EU must have complementary capabilities, in the US's view.

A European Army has progressively gained momentum with France and Germany emerging as its top proponents. Both countries are interested in promoting strategic autonomy, reducing reliance on outside sources, and enhancing defense cooperation among EU Member States. The aim to improve defense cooperation among EU Member States is one of the main reasons France and Germany want a European Army. Both nations hope to handle their common security issues with increased interoperability, effectiveness, and cost-efficiency by creating a joint military force. The EU's military system would be more effective and cohesive with improved coordination, joint training, and the pooling of resources and capabilities made available by a European Army. The need for a European Army in the 2000s was influenced by changing geopolitical circumstances, shifting social dynamics, and the requirement for a European security system. It's likely that since NATO was founded, European countries have depended too heavily on the US for their own security.

There has been a lot of debate and analysis around the reasons for and against the formation of a European Army. Numerous parties have expressed interest in and influence over the notion of a European Army. Studies have shown that when an action is thought to occur in the far future, factors in favor of it tend to become more prominent, whereas factors in opposition to it tend to become more obvious when it is perceived to occur soon. The arguments in favor of and against the creation of a European Army have received much discussion and examination. These are some of the questions that we aim to address: Why is the notion of a European Army being researched so thoroughly? Is creating such an army a feasible objective or not? What are the advantages, disadvantages, and difficulties in accomplishing it? Who supports and opposes establishing an army in Europe?

We shall attempt to analyze the historical context of the EU's military ambitions in this article. Second, we aim to assess the present discussions around the European Army. While doing this, we'll also try to explain some of the "pros" and "cons" of the desire to build a European Army as well as some problematic areas. Additionally, perspectives and motivations of France, Germany, and the US considering the creation of a European Army will be assessed.

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