



ON TRANSPARENCY, WHAT IS BEING PROMISED BY THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN TURKEY IN THEIR GENERAL ELECTION MANIFESTOS?

TÜRKİYE’DE SİYASİ PARTİLER GENEL SEÇİM BEYANNAMELERİNDE ŞEFFAFLIKLA İLGİLİ NELER VAAT EDİYOR?

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Abstract

The purpose of this study, to determine the distribution of discourses-promises on transparency in election manifestos of political parties that passed the 10% election threshold in eight general elections according to the distinction of trend slopes, party ideology (right-left) and ruling, opposing party between 1991-2015 in Turkey. Although many qualitative and quantitative studies have been conducted in the literature on the effects of the processes and results of the transparency issue after 2000, there is no study encountered analyzing the transparency discourses-promises in the statements. 28 election manifestos were analyzed with content analysis method in terms of “discourse-promise of transparency”. As a result, 258 transparency discourse promises were identified. 146 of them are administrative, 84 are financial and 28 are political transparency. In administrative transparency, providing and obtaining information and the activities of public institutions; in financial transparency, use of resource and bids; in political transparency, in line with the expectations, the discourse-promise of transparency regarding the declaration of property of politicians has come to the fore. Although there is no difference between right and left parties in terms of the discourse-promise of transparency in the statements, especially after 2000, opposition parties have a clear advantage over the ruling parties.

Keywords: *Transparency, Election Manifestos, Content Analysis.*

Öz

Bu çalışmanın amacı, Türkiye’de 1991-2015 yılları arasındaki 8 genel seçimde %10 seçim barajını geçen siyasi partilerin seçim beyannamelerinde şeffaflıkla ilgili söylemlerinin-vaatlerin trend eğimi, parti ideolojisi (sağ-sol) ve iktidar-muhalefet partisi ayrımına göre dağılımın belirlenmesidir. Literatürde, 2000’den sonra şeffaflık konusunun süreçlerinin ve sonuçlarının etkilerini konu alan çok sayıda nitel ve nicel çalışmalar yapılmış olmasına rağmen, seçim beyannamelerindeki şeffaflık söylemlerini-vaatlerini analiz eden herhangi bir çalışmaya rastlanmamıştır. 28 genel seçim beyannamesi “şeffaflık söylemi-vaadi” açısından nitel araştırma tekniklerinden içerik analizi yöntemiyle analiz edilmiştir. Analiz sonucunda toplam 258 şeffaflık söylemi-vaadi tespit edilmiştir. Bunların 146’sı idari, 84’ü mali ve 28’i de siyasi şeffaflık niteliğindedir. İdari şeffaflıkta, bilgi verme ve bilgi edinme ile kamu kurumlarının faaliyetleri; mali şeffaflıkta, kaynak kullanımı ve ihaleler; siyasi şeffaflıkta da, beklentilere uygun şekilde, politikacıların mal bildirimleriyle ilgili şeffaflık söylemi-vaadi ön plana çıkmıştır. Seçim beyannamelerindeki şeffaflık söylemi-vaadi bakımından sağ-sol partiler arasında herhangi bir fark olmadığı halde, özellikle 2000’den sonra, muhalefet partilerinin iktidar partilerine karşı açık bir üstünlüğü vardır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Şeffaflık, Seçim Beyannameleri, İçerik Analizi.*

GENİŞLETİLMİŞ ÖZET

Çalışmanın Amacı

Çalışmanın amacı, Türkiye’de 1991-2015 yılları arasındaki gerçekleştirilen 8 genel seçimde %10 seçim barajını aşarak Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nde temsil hakkı elde eden 10 farklı siyasi partinin seçim beyannamelerinde şeffaflıkla ilgili söylemlerinin-vaatlerin trend eğimi, parti ideolojisi (sağ-sol) ve iktidar-muhalefet partisi ayrımına göre dağılımının belirlenmesidir.

Araştırma Soruları

Çalışmada cevabı aranan soru, 2000’li yıllardan sonra dünyada hızla gelişen şeffaflık konusunun, ülkeyi yönetmeye talip olan siyasi partilerin seçim vaatlerine hangi düzeyde ve alanlarda yansıdığıdır. Diğer taraftan çalışmanın temel hipotezi, yazılı, görsel ve sosyal medya gibi iletişim araçlarının 2000’den sonra yaygınlaşması nedeniyle, seçim beyannamelerindeki şeffaflıkla ilgili söylemlerinin-vaatlerin trend eğiminin pozitif olacağı şeklindedir. Bu hipoteze bağlı olarak, birincisi sol partilerin sağ kökenli partilere göre, ikincisi de iktidar partilerinin muhalefet partilerine göre daha fazla şeffaflık söyleminde-vaadinde buldukları olmak üzere, iki alt hipotez belirlenmiştir.

Literatür Araştırması

Şeffaflıkla ilgili somut gelişmeler, 1950’li yıllarda basın özgürlüğü yasalarına dayandırılmış olmakla birlikte 2000’li yıllara kadar literatürde yaygın olarak çalışılmamıştır. 2000’den sonra ise dünyada internet erişiminin artması ve bilgi teknolojik ürün (bilgisayar, telefon vb.) kullanımının yaygınlaşmasıyla şeffaflık konusu da her geçen yıl daha fazla araştırmacı tarafından nitel ve nicel yöntemlerle çalışılan konu haline gelmiştir. Diğer taraftan siyasi partilerin seçim beyannameleri yoğun olarak seçimden sonra seçim vaatlerinin hangi düzeyde yerine getirildiği farklı ülke, hükümet (tek parti, koalisyon, azınlık hükümetleri, muhalefet partileri vb.) ve partiler açısından araştırılmıştır. Araştırma konusunun odağına seçim beyannameleri olarak beyannamedeki vaatlerin genel olarak ne ölçüde yerine getirilip-getirilmediği, farklı ülke (Pétry ve Collette, 2009; Thomson, 2001; Thomson, vd., 2017); hükümet türleri (tek başına-koalisyon) ve iktidar – muhalefet partileri (Moury, 2011; Toros, 2015; Naurin, 2014; Škvrňák, 2015; Bulut ve Yıldırım, 2020; Kostadinova, 2013 ve Kostadinova, 2019); parti ideolojileri (sol, sağ, merkez) (Schermann ve Ennsler-Jedenastik, 2012; Costello ve Thomson, 2008 ve Artés, 2013); hükümet sistemleri (başkanlık, yarı başkanlık, parlamenter) (Royed, 1996; Naurin, 2014); yönetim düzeyleri (merkezi, yerel) (Ashworth, 2000; Arklan ve Tanacı, 2020; Pétry, vd., 2018 ve Pétry ve Duval, 2019); konu (sağlık, eğitim, sağlık vb.) (Thomson ve Costello, 2016; Alpino, 2017; Artés ve Bustos, 2008; Artés, 2013; Thomson, 2001; Mansergh ve Thomson, 2007; Costello ve Thomson, 2008; Naurin, 2014 ve Elinder, vd., 2015); iletişim araçları (Kostadinova, 2017; Duval, 2019; Lindgren, 2018 ve Thackeray ve Tøye, 2020) vb. konularıyla ilgili yapılan çalışmalarda da seçim beyannamelerindeki şeffaflık vaatleri araştırma konusu yapılmamıştır. Türkiye’deki seçim beyannameleriyle ilgili yapılan çalışmaların önemli bir bölümü genellikle bir konu (eğitim, sağlık, ormancılık vb.) üzerinden içerik

analizi şeklindedir. Ancak bu çalışmaların hiçbirinde siyasi partilerin seçim beyannameleri şeffaflık vaatleri açısından analiz edilmemiştir.

Yöntem

Çalışmada kullanılan seçim beyannameleri, nitel yöntemlerden biri olan içerik analizi yöntemiyle analiz edilmiştir. Bu analiz için öncelikle 10 farklı siyasi partinin 28 genel seçim beyannamesindeki şeffaflık vaatleri-söylemleri listelenmiş, literatürdeki tasnife uygun olarak üçlü bir ayırım (3 ana kodlama) yapılmıştır. Daha sonra listelenen şeffaflık vaatleri-söylemleri oluşturulan alt kodlara dağıtılmıştır. Seçim yıllarına, ana kodlara, parti ideolojisine ve iktidar-muhalefet ayrımlarına göre veriler tasnif edilerek analize uygun hale getirilmiştir.

Sonuç ve Değerlendirme

Yapılan analiz sonucunda toplam 258 şeffaflık söylemi-vaadi tespit edilmiştir. Bunların 146'sı idari, 84'ü mali ve 28'i de siyasi şeffaflık niteliğindedir. İdari şeffaflıkta, bilgi verme ve bilgi edinme ile kamu kurumlarının faaliyetleri; mali şeffaflıkta, kaynak kullanımı ve ihaleler; siyasi şeffaflıkta da beklentilere uygun şekilde, politikacıların mal bildirimleriyle ilgili şeffaflık söylemi-vaadi ön plana çıkmıştır. Seçim beyannamelerindeki şeffaflık söylemi-vaadi bakımından sağ-sol partiler arasında herhangi bir fark olmadığı halde, özellikle 2000'den sonra, muhalefet partilerinin iktidar partilerine karşı açık bir üstünlüğü vardır. Diğer taraftan neredeyse tüm partilerin (Halkların Demokratik Partisi hariç) şeffaflıkla ilgili söylemlerinin-vaatlerinin arttığı görülmüştür. Bu sonuçlara göre, "seçim beyannamelerindeki şeffaflıkla ilgili söylemler-in-vaatlerin trend eğiminin pozitif olacağı" şeklindeki temel hipotez doğrulanmış; "sol partilerin sağ kökenli partilere göre", "iktidar partilerinin muhalefet partilerine göre daha fazla şeffaflık söyleminde-vaadinde buldukları" şeklindeki alt hipotezler ise doğrulanmamıştır. Çünkü analizde şeffaflık söyleminde-vaadi konusunda sağ-sol kökenli partiler arasında belirgin bir farkın olmadığı, diğer taraftan da muhalefet partilerinin iktidar partilerine göre daha fazla şeffaflık söyleminde-vaadinde bulunduğu ortaya çıkmıştır.

1. INTRODUCTION

Citizens want to be informed about the decision processes and results of government activities, and this is not a new phenomenon. The problem of transparency, which arose due to the information asymmetry that emerged as a result of government activities, became more salient with the development of democracy since the taken decisions, can affect the citizens and change their living standards and future expectations. Individual and institutional planning is constituted by taking into account the possible effects of government decisions. Besides, since the parties that form the government in democratic countries come to power by-elections, rational voters may want to make choices in a way that will provide them with the highest benefit. For this reason, sharing decisions regarding the activities of the government and their results with the citizens plays a prominent role.

The most significant point/question of transparency is what information about the decision processes and results of government activities will be transmitted to the citizens, at what level, and through which means of communication. Some information on government activities may need to remain confidential. Some information can be very technical for citizens and information asymmetry will not disappear in this sense. On the other hand, information must be transmitted through the most appropriate communication tool since a communication tool (e.g., TV) may not be used by everyone. Therefore, instead of a single communication tool, different tools may need to be used to convey information. If the process of making the information transparent is managed under the nature of the point, the required level of information will reach the target audience understandably and effectively.

Transparency of government activities, development of communication tools, political competition, voter pressure, and other factors can be mentioned. However, it is much more significant how to set up the information process that will ensure transparency because the transparency of government activities is realized as a result of the legal arrangement in which political parties will play an active role. The most prominent indication is, whether the political parties will be a party or not to this process can be seen in the election declarations prepared by the parties before the election. Election manifestos indeed reflect a sort of transparency practice because of their characteristics since political parties (if they win the election) convey information about what they will do after the election to the voters through these documents. Thus, voters have certain information about which policies shall be implemented by political parties in case they form a government after the election. In the case of governments formed by the coalition, although there is a certain deviation in the election promises, the manifestos in the election manifestos of other parties in the government provide an opportunity to have information about what they shall do after forming a government.

One of the promises of political parties in their election declarations is about transparency in public administration. When the political party wins the election and forms the government, declares it what to do in what area of transparency. From this aspect, election declarations may be one of the

important documents in terms of providing insight into how there might be developments regarding transparency after the election.

Considering the transparency process as a whole, it makes sense to frame that the starting point for this, is indeed the election manifestos. What to do with transparency is first mentioned in these documents, then concrete steps (legal regulation) are taken on the subject that was promised in advance by acting per these discourses during the government period and lastly the final step comprised of implementation of what have been discussed/explained/presented so far. Therefore, the analysis of the content of the election declarations, which constitute the first and the most significant, concrete stages of the transparency process, also plays a prominent role by providing an insight on what developments shall take place regarding transparency after the election.

In this study, based on the prominence of the election declarations in the transparency process, the manifestos and promises about transparency in 28 election declarations prepared by 10 different parties in 8 general elections between the years 1991-2015 were investigated using the content analysis method. The fact that there is no study analyzing the election manifestos in terms of transparency in the literature increases the significance of the study on this subject so far.

The fundamental hypothesis of this study is that the trend curve of the manifestos-promises about transparency in the election declarations will be positive due to the spread of communication tools such as written, visual and social media after 2000. Based on this hypothesis, two sub-hypotheses have been identified, the first is that left parties are more determined in their transparency promise/discourse than right-wing parties and the second is that the ruling parties are more determined in their transparency promise/discourse than opposition parties.

The main text of this study consists of two main sections. In the first one, the concept of transparency, development and election declarations - transparency relationship is clarified, in the second, the development and content of the studies in the relevant literature, the analysis method, and the findings reached by the content analysis of 28 general election manifestos are included. In the conclusion part of this study, the opinions reached as a result of the findings are elucidated.

2. FRAMEWORK OF TRANSPARENCY CONCEPT

The basis of sharing information about government activities with the public is based on the idea of “accountability” and is explained with the concept of “transparency”. Transparency, on the other hand, refers those external institutions (stakeholders) and real persons reach freely, properly, and on-time to the taken decisions, qualified, reliable and sufficient information on the internal functioning and the performance of the institutions during the realization of government activities in the public administration thus, transparency is presented to them in an easy, understandable form or environment. (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2009; Mitchell, 1998;

Vishwanath and Kaufmann, 1999; Porumbescu G., 2017; Cucciniello, et al., 2012; Armstrong, 2005; Porumbescu, et al., 2017; Vishwanath and Kaufmann, 1999; Ball, 2009).

Besides the extended definition above, some researchers make some additions to this definition following the role they attribute to transparency. For instance, to Stasavage (2003) transparency means that the government not only explains the policy decision but also the information used to make the decision. According to the UN, transparency is defined as unlimited access on time and in a reliable way to information of the public regarding decisions and performance in the public sector (Armstrong, 2005).

The most prominent element of transparency is "information". This information relates to the actions of governments and has a legal basis. Information shared with citizens needs to have certain characteristics that can meet the expectations of transparency within legal limits and limited flexibility. These are (Porumbescu, et al., 2017; Michener and Bersch, 2013):

1. Information shared within the framework of transparency must be recorded at every stage.
2. The information must be complete. It should contain all the necessary information to fully understand the relevant policy and activity.
3. The information should be unbiased. The information disclosed is in the form of information that explains the positive and negative aspects of a/n implemented and developed policy without exaggeration.
4. The information should be understandable (useful). The disclosed information should be clear and simple enough that everyone in the community can easily understand it. For instance, most people probably will not understand inflation data explained by mathematical formulas.
5. Information must be accurate and verified. The disclosed information must be approved and finalized by the authorities, experts, or relevant institutions.

The development of democracy and, correspondingly, the accountability of governments, have a wide field of transparency emerged. In this way, it has been possible for the processes to be formed and developed, from the processing, simplification of transparency information to its transmission to citizens with appropriate tools. Thus, transparency is also related to different study disciplines due to data collection, preparation, sharing-forwarding processes. If looked at from a different frame, transparency is not an issue that only concerns public administration. Transparency is one of the notable issues in many fields, from economics to law, from political science to sociology, hence studies on transparency are carried out in different disciplines (Del Sol, 2013).

Transparency, in most countries, is accepted as a tool to increase the effectiveness and accountability of the government, together with information sharing (Cucciniello and Nasi, 2014). Yet, it would be insufficient to explain the transparency that governments resort to in many areas and stages while carrying out their activities with just accountability because accountability is generally considered financially. Howsoever, transparency, including accountability, can be evaluated in a wider framework

when taken from the administrative, political and financial aspects, these three dimensions can be explained as follows (Cucciniello, et. al., 2012; Cucciniello and Nasi, 2014; Liem, 2007; The International Monetary Fund, 2007);

1. Administrative Transparency is the disclosure of information about the organizational structure, decision processes, administrative and bureaucratic activities of public institutions, and those who take part in these activities.

2. Fiscal (budgetary) Transparency is the comprehensive and reliable disclosure of information on how the government uses / will use public resources, as well as past, present, and future activities.

3. Political Transparency is the disclosure of information such as the duties and activities of elected political representatives, their participation in parliamentary meetings, and their salaries.

4. Another issue related to transparency is the level of information to be shared with citizens and other institutions. Doubtlessly, it is not possible to share all the administrative, political, and financial information described above. In such a case, a balance must be struck between the four elements to determine the appropriate level of transparency in public administration. These are (Bannister and Connolly, 2011);

5. The Right to Know: In democratic states, society has the right to know about the activities of governments and their consequences because those who run the government are the representatives of the citizens and public expenditures are financed by the citizens (as taxes).

6. Good Governance: It is the provision of public sector services in a way that reflects the accepted public administration values such as efficiency, fairness, integrity, and honesty as closely as possible. Transparency is considered a prominent element of good governance.

7. Exposure and Expenditure: There is a notable economic cost of presenting information with "e"-extension applications. Preparation processes for collecting, processing, and publicizing this information, are a leading cost element. On the other hand, it is a severe problem that information is presented by a computer, access by hackers to information that should remain confidential, and sharing them with everyone in a way that puts their security at risk.

8. Privacy and Freedom of Public Employees: Some of the activities of public employees related to their duties have privacy and this doubtlessly should be protected. Besides, they also have some freedom in their activities. A balance must be struck between these and transparency.

The transparency policy to be followed by the countries on the four issues mentioned above may differ because countries have their conditions, thus they have to determine and implement their transparency policies accordingly. Not every information given to the public regarding the government's activities may not increase transparency since there is a possibility of biased or misrepresented information (Porumbescu, et al., 2017).

3. DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPARENCY

There are two notable views on when transparency was first applied in public administration. One of them is the Swedish Press Freedom Act of 1776. Press freedom is seen as a leading step in public access to information through the media (Nordin, 2016). Comprehensive information on the activities of governments can be accessed through the media. According to the second thought, the adoption of the Law on the Right to Information in 1966 in the United States of America (USA) is considered as the first date of transparency practice (Liem, 2007). Another development affecting transparency in the United States is The Government in the Sunshine Act, adopted in 1976, which includes the public conduct of the government negotiations and details of the regulatory commission meetings, in other words, the decision-making process unless the information is exempted from public disclosure (Welborn, et. al., 1989). Besides these two views, it is stated that the application of transparency in wider areas was influenced by the study on "information asymmetry" by George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz, which won the 2001 Nobel Prize. It is thought that the prominence of transparency increases as the imbalance between information supply and demand negatively affects the productivity of markets (Michener and Bersch, 2013).

The practices related to the right to know, are an issue frequently stated as a leading step regarding transparency in the literature. It is observed that the first concrete developments regarding transparency emerged with the implementation of the right to know and then expanded with the sharing of information in certain areas (especially financial issues) of the public. (Del Sol, 2013; Rely and Sabharwal, 2009). Thanks to these developments, the right to know has been concurrently legally guaranteed in more and more countries (Michener and Bersch, 2013).

The second significant factor in the development of transparency is information technologies. Information technology (IT) tools and internet networks, which have become widespread at the global level especially after the 2000s, forced governments to be more transparent. When compared to transparency in public administration before and after IT, three fundamental and notable differences have emerged: data volume, formalization of data, and ease of access. Further, developments in IT reduce the cost of the transparency process and offer more practical possibilities than traditional methods (eg searching databases by keyword). IT-supported transparency application offers significant advantages compared to traditional transparency applications such as responding to information requests in a shorter time (Bannister and Connolly, 2011). More information can be easily and quickly transmitted to a prominent portion of the society through social media, corporate web pages, and e-services, which are becoming widespread with IT (Porumbescu, 2017; Grimmelikhuijsen, et al., 2013; Bertot, et. al, 2010). "E-" extension applications, which are also defined as computer-mediated transparency by Meijer (2009), are becoming widespread day by day in the form of e-government, e-

democracy, e-participation thanks to IT and provide equal opportunities to citizens in terms of access to information (Cucciniello, et. al., 2012).

It must be borne in mind that IT carries significant risks, despite its contributions in creating/exercising government activities transparent. The best example of this is the collection and publication of large amounts of information by Wikileaks, firstly from military files, and lastly from secret diplomatic documents (New York Times, 2010). In this respect, doubts about the positive effect of "e-" extension applications on transparency (when considered together with state security) have increased. Regardless of the positive contributions of traditional transparency methods are accepted, the transparencies that emerge with "e-" extension applications do not provide the same level of confidence (Bannister and Connolly, 2011; Breton, et al., 2007).

The last factor that is stated to be effective in the development of transparency is the "New Public Management" (NPM) approach. It is stated that this approach has a notable theoretical contribution to transparency, especially in terms of accountability (Hood, 1995). The reforms carried out within the framework of the NPM, the increased visibility of how public services work and the resulting increase in the performance of the government encouraged more transparency of government activities (Grimmelikhuijsen, et al., 2017). It can be said that local governments are more successful in implementing new public management principles than central government (Doğan, 2013). The most significant reason for this is that they have a closer relationship with the citizens they serve, compared to the central government.

Transparency International, which was established by Peter Eigen, who had worked as a manager at the World Bank, after the uneasiness he experienced in the early 1990s due to the failure to overcome the corruption in the credit process given to countries by the World Bank, has been very effective institutionally in the universal spread of transparency. It can be stated that the reports and indexes published by the institution every year encourage countries to be more transparent in practice (Ball, 2009).

The first concrete development regarding transparency in Turkey started with "Increasing Transparency in Turkey and Improving the Effective Management of Public Action Plan" which was adopted by the 2002/3 decree of the Council of Ministers on the date of 12.01.2002 and continued with 4982 decrees of the Act of Right to Know. It can be verbalized that the information regarding the decision-making processes and their results has reached a certain level in time. As in other countries, the widespread use of the internet after the 2000s has accelerated the development of transparency practices and a lot of information has been easily accessed.

4. EXPECTATIONS ON TRANSPARENCY

Every segment of society has different expectations from the practice of transparency. By getting more information about the public decision-making process and its consequences, citizens behave in a way that is least affected by these developments. Moreover, politicians want to come to power or maintain their power by getting more votes in elections by fulfilling the demands of the voters regarding transparency.

Considering the development of the practice of transparency, it is seen that transparency in public administration has become widespread in many countries and is supported by many reputable international organizations (Etzioni, 2010). Forasmuch as it is applied in a wide range of areas in democratic countries, at first glance, it gives the impression that it has positive effects for both voters and representatives (politicians). Yet, the positive or negative effects of the government's sharing of information about its activities with citizens may arise since only the satisfaction of the voter or representative may not be sufficient for the widespread of transparency.

Many studies have been conducted on the effects of transparency practices. According to the results of these studies, it has been observed that as the level of transparency increases in a country, the following positive developments have been experienced:

1. Efficiency in public administration increased by disciplining public employees (Grimmelikhuijsen, et al., 2017),
2. It strengthens institutionalism and develops democracy (Cucciniello, et. al., 2012; Bannister and Connolly, 2011; Michener and Bersch, 2013; Meijer, Curtin and Hillebrandt, 2012).
3. The need for supervision has decreased (Etzioni, 2010).
4. (According to some studies) trust in governments has increased (Grimmelikhuijsen, et al., 2013; Cook, et. al., 2010),
5. Corruption decreases (Chen and Neshkova, 2020; Cucciniello, et. al., 2012; Michener and Bersch, 2013; Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010; Bertot, et. al., 2010),
6. Politicians are more sensitive to voters' demands, positively affecting participation in elections (Benito and Bastida, 2009).
7. Countries with advanced transparency have a stronger economic structure (The International Monetary Fund, 2007; Cucciniello, et. al., 2012; Relly and Sabharwal, 2009).

If evaluated in general, with the practice of transparency, thanks to these developments, the durability of public institutions has increased (Meijer, et. al., 2018). These developments are as follows: The professionalization of institutions and personnel, better information recording system and flow, change and openness in decision-making processes, increased interaction with other institutions and (local) governments, etc.

Another consideration that emerges "will to knowledge" on the consequences of transparency practices is the effect of transparency practices on electoral participation. Based on the transparency of budget results and using data from 41 countries, a positive relationship was found between transparency and political participation (voting) (Benito and Bastida, 2009). Likewise, it has been observed that as transparency increases at the local government level, political participation increases (De Araujo and Tejedó-Romero, 2016).

Doubtlessly, there are negativities caused by the practice of transparency. These can be listed as follows (Meijer, et. al., 2018; Bannister and Connolly, 2011; Breton, et al., 2007; Grimmelikhuijsen, et al., 2017; Etzioni, 2010):

1. Increases public expenditure. Specialists and computers are needed in the process of creating, preparing for a presentation, and sharing information shared with citizens. These require an additional outlay.

2. It might not be possible for citizens to fully examine and understand all the information disclosed. To illustrate, very few people can understand the nature of the inspection report disclosed as a result of an audit.

3. The disclosed information may be interpreted differently by some (opposition) politicians, citizens, and media outlets (deliberately), causing them to be misunderstood.

4. If some information is leaked to certain individuals and institutions before leaked to the public, they might gain an unfair advantage. The best example of this is the development plans.

5. It can reduce bureaucrats' tendency to take risks.

6. The possibility of sharing some information about public employees and public administration that need to be secluded makes their privacy public. On the other side of the coin, this possibility, indeed, affects them negatively.

7. Since the information to be disclosed is kept in computer environments, it always carries the risk of external intervention. Furthermore, there is the possibility that the information that is still at the decision stage will emerge in this way.

In the studies conducted, (Etzioni, 2010; Etzioni, 2014; De Fine Licht, et al, 2014; De Fine Licht, 2014; De Fine Licht, 2011; Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2014, and Porumbescu, 2017) the capacity of transparency to reach the expected goals were investigated. As a result of these studies, it has been revealed that transparency is less effective than expected in achieving the determined goals. This is why the scope of transparency is limited and these changes depending on the policies of the government and the behavior of the citizens.

If evaluated as a whole, even though transparency maintains its feature of being a suitable tool to achieve the goal in certain subjects, this feature of it is seen as the most eminent reason for failure in some subjects.

4. THE RELATIONSHIP OF ELECTION MANIFESTOS AND TRANSPARENCY

The elections in democratic countries, the document in which political parties explain what they shall do when they win the election and form a government before the elections are defined as "election declaration" or "election promises". There are some early elements to consider when preparing the election manifestos. These are as follows;

1. The Party's Program: These are the texts that the party created during its establishment, updated according to the developments that emerged over time, and that mainly put forward the political philosophy of the party. To illustrate, fundamental issues such as eliminating poverty, making income distribution fairly, eliminating regional imbalances, and developing the market economy can be determined as targets. To put this on a further step, the promises in the election manifesto of a political party that aims to develop the market economy in the party program ought to affiliate with this. Any other way, if the political party promises the opposite in the election manifestos, it might have a problem of trust in the voters right from the start.

2. Current Circumstances in the Country: Economic, social, international relations, etc. of the country. it should state in what position it is in matters, what kind of change the political party shall make in them. For instance, to ensure the economic development of the country, it ought to include in the election declaration, considering the current conditions, which economic policy it shall apply, how it will follow in matters such as foreign trade, foreign exchange, interest. Even though poverty and housing are a severe problem in the country (in the current situation), those who do not mention this at all or make unrealistic promises (such as tripled minimum wage) have poor credibility.

3. Future Vision of the Country: Nowadays, rapid changes and developments in the technological field offer important opportunities. To illustrate, unmanned vehicles, energy, logistics, autonomous systems, and so on. It is strongly foreseen that there will be notable developments in many areas. In such an environment, how the country will develop in which areas; how to acquire these technologies and compete with other countries should be included in the election manifestos.

4. General Demands of Voters: The three issues stated above can be made more specific through voter demands. Yet, voters may have more specific demands on some issues than others. For instance, the demands of voters in individual areas such as 'solely' housing, health, education only should be taken into account in election manifestos.

Election declarations can increase the likelihood of the political party's success in the elections, as they will have high credibility in the eyes of the voters when they are prepared realistically and taking into account these four fundamental elements. Withal, it should not be forgotten that the success of political parties in the elections is not solely possible with the realism and seriousness of the promises made in the election declarations, and other notable factors affect the election success.

The most prominent relationship between election manifestos and transparency is the information disclosed through election manifestos. According to this, the parties participating in the elections list the information about what they will do when they win the election and form a government and share this with the voters using various communication tools. Particularly, information shared through election manifestos provides many conditions of transparency (preparation of information, making it understandable, presenting it on time, etc.).

Another aspect of the relationship between election manifestos and transparency closely concerns the promises of "transparency" in the manifestos. In the election declarations of political parties, after winning the election and forming a government, it is explained which policies will be implemented in which areas related to transparency. Election declarations of political parties must be examined and analyzed to foresee the developments regarding transparency after the elections.

5. LITERATURE

Even though the developments regarding transparency date back to the 1950s, it is seen that the academic studies on this subject have intensified after the 1990s, but have increased eminently after 2000. It is observed that studies have developed in parallel with this, due to the implementation of transparency in a wide area (education, health, judiciary, security, etc.). Notwithstanding, if it is necessary to classify the studies on transparency, a triple distinction can be made as decision-making processes, policy content, and policy results. Another common classification used in the literature is political (diplomatic), administrative, and financial (budgetary) transparency (Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch, 2012; Heald, 2006; Cucciniello, et. al., 2017).

In the literature review, the issue of transparency in election manifestos or government programs has not been explored either by considering election manifestos as a means of transparency or in terms of promises of transparency in manifestos. Instead, it is perceived that the results of transparency applications are emphasized in the studies in the literature. Put it differently, the practice of transparency on corruption, participation in elections, trust in government, efficiency in administration, economic structure, etc. (Cucciniello, et. al., 2017 and Grimmelikhuijsen, et. al., 2017).

The analysis carried out over 21 different studies on the fulfillment of election promises in the USA (13), Canada (4), England (2), the Netherlands (1), and Greece (1) covering different election periods between the years 1912 and 2006, the average It has been observed that 67% of the election promises were fulfilled. Among these, the lowest rate emerged in the USA with 52% in 1980-1988, and the highest with 85% in the UK study for the years between 1979-1988 (Thomson, 2001; Mansergh and Thomson, 2007; Pétry and Collette, 2009).

In the study conducted by Thomson et al. (2017), 57 government parties from 12 different countries, a single party with the legislative majority, a single party with a legislative minority and a

coalition with a legislative majority and a coalition with a legislative minority were analyzed for 20,023 election promises. Thus, it is concluded that single-party governments with a legislative majority have a higher rate of fulfilling their election promises than coalitions. For the 12 countries analyzed, concluded that the rate of the fulfillment of election promises is the highest in England and the lowest in Austria.

In the analysis for the rate of the fulfillment of election promises during the 4 electoral periods in Italy between the years 1996-2006 (Moury, 2011); in Sweden between the years 1994-2010 (Naurin, 2014), in the Czech Republic between the years 2010-2013 (Škvřňák, 2015) concluded that coalition governments have a lower rate of the fulfillment of election promises than single-party governments. Royed (1996) found that the rate of the fulfillment of election promises is higher in Britain, where a single-party is in power than in the USA. In other studies, conducted for other countries on this issue, it has been concluded that the rate of the fulfillment of promises is higher in single-party governments (Naurin, 2014). The study conducted by Kostadinova (2013), revealed that 6 political parties participated in the elections in Bulgaria between the years 1997-2001, fulfilled 60% of 792 promises.

The study carried out by Schermann and Ennser-Jedenastik (2012), revealed that institutional factors (status quo policies, controlled ministries, and commitment to coalition agreement) were highly effective in fulfilling more than 500 election promises by the Austrian People's Party (OVP) and the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) in the 2002 elections, whereas intraparty competition (political differences, clarity of promises, intraparty agreement and majority support in parliament) proved to be ineffective.

Costello and Thomson (2008) examined/analyzed the level of fulfillment of election promises in the center-right coalition formed by The Republican Party (Fianna Fáil) and Progressive Democrats (PDs) parties in Ireland between 2002 and 2007. The rate of the fulfillment of election promises (partially and completely) is 51% for Fianna Fáil and 66% for PDs. The same rate was found as 43% for Sinn Féin (SF), 34% for the Green Party, and 46% for the Labor Party, which is one of the opposition parties.

In the study conducted by Artés (2013) on the level of realization of economic promises in the election declarations of the People's Party and the Socialist Party during the 4 elections held in Spain between 1989 and 2004, it is found that the ruling party has a higher rate of realizing its promises than the opposition; It is concluded that there is no discreteness/difference in the rate of promise fulfillment between minority governments and majority governments.

Ashworth (2000) investigated the election manifestos of local elections in Wales in the year 1995 with content analysis method in terms of accountability and he concluded that most of the local election promises were detailed and specific moreover, had a substantial structure in terms of accountability.

Pétry, et. al. (2018) concluded that the rate of fulfilling the election promises of parties at the Quebec State level is lower than the national parties.

Artés and Bustos (2008) analyzed the election promises on economic issues in Spain between 1989-2000 in terms of the party forming the government and the small parties that support it in the minority governments. He concluded that minority governments formed with the support of the small party had positive results in terms of fulfilling the promises.

Thomson and Costello (2016) investigated how the economic conditions in Ireland between the years 1977-2011 affected the fulfillment of the election promises since the parties that make up the government do not make their election promises according to the current economic conditions and do not make promises by predicting the future economic conditions and thus concluded that it adversely affected the fulfillment of election promises.

Politicians' economic policy promises made during the election campaign on the concern 'there will be a change or not' in voting rates in the 2006 election campaign in Italy, examined by Alpino (2017) Thus, Silvio Berlusconi's promise on remittance of the property tax from the primary residences has led a dramatic increase of his voting rate.

The study conducted by Elinder, et. al. (2015), concluded that how the voters behave during voting through the promises on child support to families by political parties, the Social Democratic Party in Sweden's cut aid back to families with children in 1994, concluded that families with children generally take into account their economic promises. In the experimental study conducted by Andreas, et. al. (2018) in Erfurt, the election promises made by the voters for the first time, affect the voting choice of the voter, and the voters are punitive about the unfulfilled election promises by looking at whether the promises made by those who also participated in the previous elections are fulfilled or not.

Kostadinova (2017) analyzed the rate of 3,083 promises of 15 political parties in the printed media during the seven elections in Bulgaria between the years 1990-2009, observed that the large parties had more place in the newspapers than the small parties, compared to the small parties.

Lindgren (2018) concluded that the use of meaningful words such as "freedom, equality" in the election manifesto may affect voters.

Another study by Kostadinova (2019) also investigated the effect of the media on the fulfillment of the 2,676 election promises of 14 parties in 15 years between 1994-2009 in Bulgaria, thus he concluded that the media visibility of the election promises also encouraged (maybe forced) them to realize and the control function on behalf of the voter.

Duval (2019) examined 244 election promises of the ruling Conservative Party in Canada for the 2008-2011 period, to inform citizens in cases where election promises are not fulfilled. It was

inferred that the ruling party's failure to fulfill its election promises informed the citizens in the media, almost as a “thief alarm model”.

In the study carried out by Thackeray and Toye (2020), the election declarations and election brochures of the candidates in England between 1900-1997 were examined in terms of form and shape, how the form affects the content, and the possible consequences of this in later periods.

Most of the studies about the election returns in Turkey document analysis and content analysis with a specific subject (education, forestry, tourism, etc.). The distribution and development of the promises were examined. Few studies, on the other hand, have investigated the fulfillment levels of election promises.

The study conducted by Toros (2015), is about how many of 420 promises fulfilled by forming parties between the years 1983-2011 in Turkey. Thus, the study reveals that the single-party government brought the rate to its promises, according to the period of coalition government were higher. Between the years 1983-2011, the area with the highest rate of the fulfillment of election promises by fields is culture and art with 71.4%, and democracy with the lowest with 42.9%.

Bulut and Yıldırım (2020) analyzed the distribution and development of the election promises of the ruling one, Justice and Development Party (AKP), and the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP) between 2002 and 2011 in terms of their fulfillment levels. If the AKP's rate of fulfilling its promises is higher than the CHP, the number of CHP's election promises has increased more than both the AKP and its previous promises.

Karaçor and Çelebi Zengin (2012) state that whether the promises made by political parties in their election declarations were correctly received or not by the voters through 1907 voters in Konya and concluded that most of the voters did not have enough information about the election promises of the parties, and they did not even know which promises belong to which party at all.

Kalçık (2016) researched the effect of the economic promises in the AKP's, 11th of November 2015 General Election Statement on the election results, based on the surveys conducted by the research companies on the subject, and concluded that the voters take into account not only the election promises but also the possibility of realizing these promises.

Turkey's election manifesto on specific topics (education, forestry etc.) and other studies about the distribution of election promises can be grouped as follows:

1. Education, (Tok, 2012; Toprakçı and Akçay Güngör, 2014; Gürsoy and Balcı Karaboğa, 2015; Turkish Education Association (TEDMEM), 2015; Altınışık and Songür, 2016; Polat, et. al., 2016; Erkılıç and Dilbaz, 2017),

2. Forestry, (Atmış, 2008; Atmış and Günşen, 2011 and Coşkun, et. al., 2015,

3. Social policy (Tiyek, 2015);

4. Environment, (Ertürk and Şeşen, 2017a);
5. European Union, (Kilit and Çatır, June 2015 and Akçay 2018),
6. Foreign politics (Dizdaroğlu, 20 July 2007),
7. Librarianship, information and document management, (Polat, et. al., 2015 and Polat, et. al., 2016),
8. Public relations, (Ertürk and Şeşen, 2017),
9. Freedom, economic and cultural policies, (Şahin, 2016),
10. Defense and security, (Yılmaz and Derdiman, 2014 and Strategic Thinking Institute, 2011),
11. Women, (Terkan, 2010),
12. Reform on public administration, (Sadioğlu, 2017)
13. Local Administrations, (Eren, et. al., 2012)
14. Tourism, (Erkmen, et. al., 2019)
15. Technology, (Alp and Turan, 2018);
16. Concreteness and measurability of election promises, (Kavas and Taşöz Düşündere, 2019)
17. Topics where the promises are predominant (Aytaç, 2017 and Çatı and Cengiz, 2019),
18. Formal, content, and document review (Özkaynar, 2015; Sayın and Gümüş, 2016; Strategic Thinking Institute, October 2015; Arklan and Tanacı, 2020).

Witnesseth, when the studies in the literature on transparency and election manifestos are examined separately, no study has been come across, directly examines the concern of transparency through content or election manifestos as a means of transparency practice. For this reason, it can be stated that this study is notable in terms of contributing to the literature and showing that the election manifestos can also be the subject of research in terms of transparency.

6. DATA, METHODS AND ANALYSIS

6.1. Data Collection and Classification

Between the years 1991-2015, 8 general elections were held in Turkey. In these elections, the parties as follows (Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) (SHP) 1, Virtue Party (FP) 1, Welfare Party (RP) 2, True Path Party (DYP) 3, Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) 2, Democratic Left Party (DSP) 3, the Motherland Party (ANAP) 3, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) 5, AKP (Justice and Development Party, 5 and CHP Republican People's Party 6) passed the election threshold by the ratio of over 10%, and acquire the right of representation in Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) (Supreme Electoral Council, 2020). The distribution of parties' commitments to transparency in public administration was investigated through 28 general election manifestos of 10 political parties in 8 general election periods. The separation of parties from "right" (FP, RP, DYP, ANAP, MHP, and AKP) and "left" (SHP, DSP, CHP, and HDP) is based on the definition in party programs.

Whilst examining the general election declarations in terms of transparency, the "transparency" expressions that they promised to apply in public administration after political parties came to power were taken into consideration. As in many studies, promises regarding "reducing corruption" were ignored because it is a result to be achieved with the practice of transparency. Still and all, if policies to prevent corruption include transparency, this is included in the research as a promise of transparency.

It was determined that the transparency promises and discourses in the election declaration used in the study were measurable and compatible with the requirements to meet the transparency criteria defined in the study. Within the framework of these criteria, transparency "promises" and "discourses", the general election declarations of political parties were divided into three main groups as administrative, financial, and political according to the election years, and then these three main groups were codified (total 19), lastly, its density also measured according to the periods, parties, and the fields that all these were to be applied. Consequently, since the study was conducted with the method of "content analysis", one of the qualitative research techniques, the manifestos of transparency and promises were taken into consideration together in the election manifestos within the framework of the criteria determined above. Nonetheless, expressions and discourses like information transfer such as wishes, criticism, determination of the situation, past practices, consultancy services (to tradesmen, farmers, etc.) regarding transparency in the election declarations were not included in the analysis. Markings were made for each transparency discourse-promise of a party that is classified in different areas but under the same code. Hence, numerical equivalents such as 2, 3, 4, and 5 have emerged in some codes.

6.2. Method

Content analysis is one of the qualitative and appropriate analysis methods used in the analysis of election manifestos consisting of texts by political parties as a means of communication with the society. Content analysis, which is widely used in political text analysis, aims to reveal the basic structure of texts in the light of the systematic and objective path. Berelson (1952) released/examined content analysis of political parties' election manifestos, election speeches, election advertisements, and campaigns. Contrarily, in today's world, scientific studies, news, books, and so forth perceived that content analysis is widely used in the analysis of texts.

In content analysis, also known as the coding of the information in the selected text, multifarious topics are listed and a systematic structure is created with the information related to them in the text (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). As Neuendorf and Kumar (2016) proffered, the content analysis of the study was made in the following order:

1. Developing Familiarity with Data: Reading the election statement texts completely and transferring the sections related to transparency to the analysis text,

2. Creating Precodes: The transparency promises in the analysis text document are first classified with triple code analogously the classification in the theory, and then sub-codes are created,

3. Searching Themes / Subject Matter: Classification of the data in the analysis text (promises of transparency) by categorizing them into potential themes (under administrative, financial and political transparency),

4. Reviewing Themes / Subject Matter: Checking the accuracy of the encoded data, creating an analysis map-table

5. Naming and Identifying Themes / Subject Matter: Naming the determined themes (titles of sub-codes) and defining them,

6. Creating Report: Reporting the research by taking the findings in the literature into consideration after the analysis is done.

In the names of validity and reliability of the content analysis used in the study, the codes and themes/subject matter determined during the classification of the data were concretized as much as possible and the analysis of the widely used researchers was mutually checked (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Likewise, a researcher who applied content analysis was asked to encode and create the themes, and problematic themes were corrected by checking to what extent the themes/subject matter revealed by the independent researcher fit with the themes in the analysis. Thusly, the reliability and validity of the method reached an acceptable level in qualitative methods.

6.3. Analysis and Evaluation

A total of 258 discourses-promises about transparency were determined in the analysis made on 28 election declarations of parties that passed the election threshold in eight general elections held between the years 1991-2015. Transparency, then, the discourse-promise classification made according to administrative, financial and political distinction, the weight percent (56.6% of total promises) is related to administrative transparency, this is financial (32.6% of total promises) and political (10.9% of total promises). Hence clearly seen that the transparency discourse-promise follows (Chart 1 and Table 1). Consequently, these data show that political parties mainly set up the issue/matter of transparency on the transparency of administrative activities.


Table 1. The Promises-Discourses on Transparency of The Political Parties in General Election Declarations, 1991 – 2015

General Election Year	Political Parties	The Subject Matter of Transparency Promises-Discourses in Electoral Declarations																							
		1. Administrative									2. Economic (Fiscal)						3. Political				GRAND TOTAL				
		1.1. Right to Know	1.2. Sharing Scientific Information and Information in Other Fields	1.3. The Activities of the Government, Public Administration, Institutions, Administration	1.4. Local Administration (Administrative, Fiscal)	1.5. The Reports of Audit Office, Constitutional Courts and Judicial Institutions	1.6. Declaration of Property (Government Executives)	1.7. Construction Plan	1.8. Research, Database, Sharing Information	1.9. Freedom of the Press	TOTAL	2.1. Public Procurements (Privatization, Merchandise of Goods-Services)	2.2. Financial Markets, Institutions	2.3. Economic Policies	2.4. Public Finance	2.5. Public Expenditures	2.6. Government Expenditures	2.7. Commercial Data Sharing	TOTAL	3.1. Property Declaration (Mayors, Members of Parliament, Party Directors) and Financial Supports to Political Parties		3.2. Election Financing and Expenditures of Political Parties and Candidates	3.3. Public Assembly Meetings	TOTAL	
1991	DSP							1	1									1						3	
	SHP*								1	1														1	
	ANAP	1								1														1	
	DYP*	1	1							1	3		1					1						4	
1995	RP							3	3		1	1						2						5	
	CHP								1	1	1	1						2						3	
	DSP*	1	1							2	1	1	1				1	4						6	
1999	RP*		1							1														1	
	DSP*	1	1		1					3	1	1	1	1				4						7	
	ANAP*	1								1		1						1						2	
	FP	1		1	1					3	1	1						2						5	
2002	MHP*	1				1			1	3	1	1						2	1	1			2	7	
	CHP	1		3	1		1		1	7	1	1	1		1	1		5	1				1	13	
	AKP*	1	1	2			1			5	1	1		1	1			4		1			1	10	
2007	CHP			3	2			1		1	7	1	1		1	1		4	1	1			2	13	
	AKP*			2			1			1	4							1	1	1			2	7	
	MHP	1		1			1			3	1			1	1	1	1	5	1	1			2	10	
2011	CHP	1	3	3	1		1	1		1	11	1		1				2	1	1			2	15	
	AKP*		3	3	1						7		1			1	1	1	4		1			1	12
	MHP	1	5	2	1	1	1			1	12	1	1		1	1	1	2	7	1	1		2	21	
June 2015	CHP	1	4	5	1	1	1	1		1	15	1		1				5	1	1			2	22	
	HDP	1		1						1	3	1						1						4	
	AKP*		2	2	1	1	1				7	1				1	1	1	4	1	1		2	13	
November 2015	MHP	1	2	2			1	1	1		9	1	2		1	1	1	1	7	1	1		2	18	
	CHP	1	3	5	1		1	1		1	13	1		1		1		4	1	1			2	19	
	HDP	1								1	2	1						1						3	
	AKP*		1	6			1		1		9	1	2				1	1	5	1	1		2	16	
Grand Total	MHP	1	3	1		1	1	1		1	9	1	1		1	1	1	6	1	1			2	17	
		18	31	42	11	6	11	7	5	15	146	19	16	10	6	13	10	10	84	13	14	1	28	258	

Source: Justice and Development Party, 2002, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2015a; the Motherland Party, 1991; the Motherland Party, 1999; Republican People's Party, 2002, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2015a; Republican People's Party, 1995; Democratic Left Party, 1991; Democratic Left Party, 1995; Democratic Left Party, 1999; Right Way Party, 1991; The Virtue Party, 1999; Social Democratic People's Party, 1991; Peoples' Democratic Party, 2015; Peoples' Democratic Party, 2015a; Nationalist Movement Party, 1999; Nationalist Movement Party, 2007; Nationalist Movement Party, 2011; Nationalist Movement Party, 2015; Nationalist Movement Party, 2015a; Welfare Party, 1991; Welfare Party, 1995 and Doğan and Sarısoy, 2018.

*: Parties that taking part in government.

Graphic 1. The Discourses-Promises on Transparency in General Election Declarations Field by Field, 1991-2015



Source: Prepared according to Table 1.

If looked at the low-level distributions of transparency discourses-promises, the transparency (42 promises) of the "Activities of the Government, Public Administration, Institutions/ Administrations" classified under administrative transparency is in the first place, whilst it is "Sharing Information (Scientific and Other Fields)" (31 promises) and "Public Procurements (Privatization, Purchase of Goods-Services - Sales of Goods-Services)" (19 promises), which are classified under financial transparency, followed by discourses and promises to make them transparent. Discourses-promises of transparency on "Election Financing and Expenditures of Political Parties and Candidates", classified under political transparency, has the highest share (14 promises) in this category (Table 1).

If looked at the development of the discourses and promises about transparency in the election declarations of the political parties, a rapid increase in this issue after the 2007 elections come to the limelight. In 4 general election periods between 1991-2002 and 14 election manifestos, there were a total of 68 transparency discourses-promises, compared to 190 transparency discourses-promises in 4 general election periods and 14 general election manifestos between 2007-2015 (Table 1). These indicators are also on the hypothesis of this study. As referred so far, revealed that the discourse and development of transparency in Turkey developed after the 2000s.

CHP (85 discourses-promises) ranks first in the distribution of transparency discourses-promises, followed by MHP (73 discourses-promises) and AKP (58 discourses-promises). In a total of 8 election periods, an average of 32.3 per election and 9.2 per election declaration was found in 28 general election manifestos. In the name of average transparency discourse-promise per election period, MHP (14.6 average discourse-promise) ranked first, CHP (14.2 average discourse-promise), and third place AKP (11.6 average discourse-promise). SHP (1) takes the last place in this ranking (Table 2).

Table 2. The Promises and Discourses of Left and Right Parties Field by Field, 1991-2015

Electoral Period		1991	1995	1999	2002	2007	2011	2015-I	2015-II	Total	Average	
Total		14	10	21	23	30	48	57	55	258	32.3	
Left Parties	CHP	1*		1		7	7	11	15	13	54	9
		2**		2		5	4	2	5	4	22	3.7
		3***		0		1	2	2	2	2	9	1.5
	DSP	1*	1	2	3						6	2
		2**	1	4	4						9	3
		3***	1	0	0						1	0.3
	HDP	1*							3	2	5	2.5
		2**							1	1	2	1
		3***							0	0	0	0
	SHP	1*	1								1	1
		2**	0								0	0
		3***	0								0	0
Right Parties	AKP	1*				5	4	7	7	9	32	6.4
		2**				4	1	4	4	5	18	3.6
		3***				1	2	1	2	2	8	1.6
	ANAP	1*	1		1						2	1
		2**	0		1						1	0.5
		3***	0		0						0	0
	DYP	1*	3								3	3
		2**	1								1	1

	3***	0								0	0
FP	1*			3						3	3
	2**			2						2	2
	3***			0						0	0
MHP	1*			3		3	12	9	9	36	7.2
	2**			2		5	7	7	6	27	5.4
	3***			2		2	2	2	2	10	2
RP	1*	3	1							4	2
	2**	2	0							2	1
	3***	0	0							0	0

Source: Prepared according to Table 1. *: Administrative Transparency Discourses-Promises; **: Financial Transparency Discourses-Promises; ***: Political Transparency Discourses-Promises

Right-wing parties surpassed right-left parties on the table which point to the rates of the promises and discourses of them, field by field. It is seen that this difference continues in the analyzed 8 general elections. A total of 109 (42.2%) in 12 election manifestos of 4 leftist parties in 8 general election periods; 149 (57.8%) manifestos of transparency were identified in 6 right-wing parties and 16 general election manifestos. Whilst the average transparency discourse-promise per general election statement was 9.1 for left parties, it was 9.3 for right-wing parties. In both right and left parties, there is a dashing advantage of administrative transparency discourses-promises over fiscal and political transparency discourses-promises (Table 2 and Table 3).

Granting all these it can be seen that right-wing parties promise more transparency in their discourse than left parties, can be verbalized that this is not exactly what it is seen since right-wing parties have superiority over left parties in terms of the number of parties and election manifestos. Moreover, two of the three parties (AKP and MHP) that passed the election threshold in the 2007-2015-II elections consist of right-wing parties. In light of this idea, the average number of transparency manifestos-promises per election declaration was 9.3 for right-wing parties and 9.1 for left-wing parties, which was very close to each other. If these reasons are considered together, one cannot speak of the real superiority of right-wing parties in their transparency discourses-promises over left parties.

Table 3. The Discourses and Promises of Parties in Electoral Periods by %. 1991-2015


Election Years	Total	Left Parties					Right Parties						
		CHP	DSP	HDP	SHP	Total	AKP	ANAP	DYP	FP	MHP	RP	Total
1991	100.0		21.4		7.1	28.6		7.1	28.6			35.7	71.4
1995	100.0	30.0	60.0			90.0						10.0	10.0
1999	100.0		33.3			33.3		9.5		23.8	33.3		66.7
2002	100.0	56.5				56.5	43.5						43.5
2007	100.0	43.3				43.3	23.3				33.3		56.7

2011	100.0	31.3				31.3	25.0				43.8		68.8
2015-I	100.0	38.6		7.0		45.6	22.8				31.6		54.4
2015-II	100.0	34.5		5.5		40.0	29.1				30.9		60.0
Total	100.0	32.9	18.8	2.7	1.2	42.2	22.5	1.2	1.6	1.9	28.3	2.3	57.8

Source: Prepared according to Table 1.

Witnesseth, trend slope of the discourses-promises about transparency from 1991 to 2015 is positive. In 1991, it was identified as 55 in the November 2015 General Election Declarations, against a total of 14 manifestos-promises on transparency. To express pro rota, the discourses-promises of transparency in the general election manifestos increased by 292.9% in 24 years. Looking at the averages per declaration, whilst the transparency discourse-promise per general election declaration in 1991 was 2.8, it was realized as 14 in November 2015. This indicator reveals that the general trend in the discourse-promise of transparency in the general election declarations is positive, despite the breaks/piques in certain periods (Table 2 and Graph 2). These findings considerably support the hypothesis that the main hypothesis of the study is that the trend slope of the manifestos-promises about the transparency in the election manifestos will be positive.

Graphic 2. The Development of Transparency Discourses-Promises of Right and Left Parties in General Election Declarations, 1991-2015



Source: Prepared according to Table 1.

Notwithstanding the slope of the left parties turned negative in certain periods, the trend of transparency manifestos-promises in the election declarations generally continued to be positive (Table 2). Even though there is no extraordinary change in the number of declarations examined for each election period, this notable increase in the transparency manifestos-promises brings the idea to the limelight that there is a considerable social demand for transparency.

The findings here did not confirm the sub-hypotheses of the research that “left-wing parties are based on right-wing parties” and “ruling parties promise more transparency in their discourse than opposition parties” since the analysis findings underline that there is no difference between the right-left ideological dissidence/difference of the political parties regarding the discourses and promises about transparency. In other words, it has been revealed that the opposition parties promise more transparency in their discourse than the ruling parties.

In the period analyzed, due to the lack of sufficient data, an analysis could not be made regarding whether there was a significant change in the transparency promises of the political party in the elections they participated in the opposition and after they came to power.

7. CONCLUSION

Transparency, based on accountability to citizens for the results of government activities, has evolved from economy to finance, from foreign policy to security, and to a practice that has a wider impact. Even so, the first practice/step of transparency was based on the Law of Freedom of the Press enacted in Sweden in 1776, seeing that it became widespread after the 2000s. The fundamental ground for this is the rapid development in communication technologies and the use of communication tools. If these developments and the literature on transparency are duly examined, clearly seen that the studies have become more widespread after the 2000s.

Citizens', who are accepted as the main addressee, 'made men' of the transparency practice, desire to learn about the government's decision-making processes and their consequences, made politicians more interested in this issue. In the election declarations, one of the most prominent communication tools between the voters and the elected, more and more promises of transparency have been included in each election period. Thus, political parties try to influence their voting preferences by conveying the message to voters that when they come to power, they will ensure greater transparency regarding government activities.

Even though there are notable pros to the widespread use of transparency practices, (highly) probable that the same results will not be achieved all the time and in every society. Likewise, although are being informed about government activities has eliminated the information asymmetry on that issue to some extent, it can also cause distrust in the government in some cases since trust caused by not

having information on a certain subject may turn into insecurity whilst a development below expectations occurs after having information on the same subject.

In the literature, numerous studies have been carried out using quantitative and qualitative research techniques on transparency. Some of these studies are on decision processes, and an eminent part of them is on the effects of decision results. Yet, in the examination conducted, none of the studies were conducted by taking into account the transparency in the election manifestos.

The content analysis over qualitative analysis techniques applied to 28 transparency discourses of 10 political parties that passed the electoral threshold by 10% in 8 general elections held in Turkey between the years 1991-2015 and according to the measurability criteria, a total of 258 transparency manifestos-promises have been identified in the general election manifestos. If classified the discourse-promise of transparency according to its administrative, financial (fiscal), and political quality, found that 59.6% was administrative, 29.8% was financial (fiscal) and 10.5% was political.

In the light of these, perceived that political parties emphasize the transparency of administrative activities. Considering that administrative activities are carried out by bureaucrats, it would not be wrong to say that bureaucratic activities constitute the focus of transparency. Further, having transparency discourses and promises in the financial field is important in terms of knowing where public resources are used, the perception in the society that the public generally carries out activities without efficiency makes financial transparency eminent.

The findings of the analysis underline that the most eminent issue regarding transparency is the transmission of information to the citizens since 49 (19%) of the 258 transparency discourses-promises are related to the transmission of information, which is the most significant element of transparency, to the citizen and what to do to meet the information demand of the citizen as much as possible. That is to say, bureaucrats behave timidly due to the responsibility that the shared information imposes on the producer and therefore not sharing information unless it is necessary, maybe a reason for the issue to be considered notable in the election manifestos.

The second issue/concern focused on transparency after information in the election manifestos is related to the transparency (12%) of the activities of public institutions. With the widespread use of the Internet, institutions have had the opportunity to easily reach citizens through their websites. Considering that politicians shall fulfill their promises during the election period through public institutions, the eminence of citizens knowing what these institutions are doing explains why this issue is severely significant in the election declarations.

A significant issue in fiscal transparency in public procurements, which underline the eminence of whether large-scale public merchandise and transactions are made in the name of objectiveness and highest benefit criteria.

According to the analysis findings, the most prominent issue regarding political transparency is related to the property declarations of politicians. The most notable societal impact on the issue of declaration of assets is the increase in assets of some politicians after being elected, disproportionate to their income.

Among the 10 political parties included in the analysis, CHP made the most-promise in its transparency discourse. MHP and AKP follow CHP. However, looked at this data at the beginning of the election declaration, seen that CHP and MHP are very close to each other. The most significant common feature of these two parties includes 'more' transparency in their election manifestos, albeit they are opposition parties in most of the periods examined.

In the 24 years between the years 1991-2015, noticed that the transparency discourse-promise trend in election manifestos has a positive slope. Taking into account the election declarations as a reflection of the demands of the voters, this trend has also confirmed that the demands for transparency in society are constantly increasing.

Since political parties are classified or named as right and left, out of 10 parties included in the analysis, 4 are left and 6 are right. Of the 28 general election declarations, 12 belong to leftist and 16 to right-wing parties. If looked at the analysis results in terms of right-left parties, even though the right parties have a notable advantage over the left parties by percentage, the difference between right and left parties is almost non-existent according to the averages per election declaration. These data suggest that the promises of transparency-related discourses in Turkey point that regardless of the party ideology. Yet, when the issue is examined from the perspective of the ruling and opposition parties, it has been determined that especially after 2000, the opposition parties include more transparency discourse-promise in their election declarations than the ruling party. Whilst these results support the basic hypothesis of the research, they do not confirm the sub-hypotheses at all.

To summarize, in 8 general elections held in 24 years, in a total of 28 election declarations prepared by 10 political parties that passed the electoral threshold by 10%, determined that the promises of transparency increased after the 2000s and the increase was positively inclined. In terms of transparency, the prominent issues in the election declarations include transmitting information in the field of administrative transparency and the right to know of citizens and public institution activities; resource use and tenders in financial transparency; political transparency is also on making politicians' property declarations transparent. Whilst there is an obvious advantage of right-wing parties in transparency discourses-promises, the difference, on the other side of the coin, is very slight compared to the average per election declaration. Therefore, it can be stated that transparency discourses-promises in election declarations are independent of party ideologies. Any other way, in terms of the ruling - opposition parties in 2002 and the following years, the opposition parties have a salient advantage over the ruling parties.

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