Journal of Economics and Administrative Sciences

Abstract

This study focuses on the presidential election crises in Lebanon, examining the relationship between the country’s sectarian power-sharing political system and weak state dynamics, as well as the impact of external actors on these processes. Lebanon’s consociational democracy model aims to ensure the political representation of different religious and sectarian groups within society. However, this system has created a rigid structure resistant to reforms, perpetuating a cycle of constant crises. The study examines the presidential election terms of Michel Suleiman in 2008, Michel Aoun in 2016, and Joseph Aoun in 2025 as case studies. It finds that the political deadlocks experienced during these periods were shaped not only by Lebanon’s internal dynamics but also by the interventions of regional and international actors. Specifically, the analysis highlights the effects of political polarization following Rafik Hariri’s assassination, the Syrian Civil War, and the Hezbollah-Israel War on presidential election processes. Using a qualitative approach, the research draws on academic articles, reports, and media sources. Findings reveal that the current power-sharing system increases vulnerability to external interventions, obstructs decision-making processes, and perpetuates Lebanon’s status as a “weak state.” Moreover, unresolved representation issues and the continuous postponement of political reform initiatives sustain the cycle of crises. The study emphasizes that Lebanon’s example offers valuable lessons for countries like Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, which face similar sectarian and/or ethnic divisions. The findings suggest that achieving political stability in Lebanon requires limiting external interventions, establishing a more inclusive constitutional framework, and implementing reforms to enhance representation.