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Rawls Düşüncesinde Örtüşen Görüş Birliği ve Makuliyet

Year 2023, Volume: 24 Issue: 3, 445 - 458, 31.07.2023
https://doi.org/10.37880/cumuiibf.1287125

Abstract

Rawls'un siyasal liberalizmi, liberal demokrasinin felsefi bir açıklamasını sağlama şeklindeki geleneksel siyaset teorisi hedefini terk eder. Bununla birlikte Rawls, “modus vivendi” uzlaşması dediği şeyden daha derin gerekçelerle vatandaşlar tarafından onaylanan liberal bir siyasi düzeni de amaçlar. Fakat çoğulcu ve özgür bir liberalizm özlemi, rakip kapsamlı doktrinler arasında bir modus vivendi uzlaşmasından daha derin bir şey olarak onaylanan bir liberalizm hedefiyle çelişir görünmektedir. Bir uzlaşma yerine “kendi iyiliği için” desteklenen bir liberalizm, zorunlu olarak, siyasal liberalizmin çiğnediği türden bir tür iyi kavramına dayanmalıdır. Bizce bu nedenle Rawls siyaset felsefesinde kapsamlı olmayan, ancak yine de ahlaki bir gerekçe sunmaya çalışır. Her ne kadar Rawls’un görüşünü onaylayanlar sıklıkla bu tür eleştirilerin, felsefi olarak kapsamlı bir yol izlemekten başka ahlaki bir gerekçe sunulamayacağı şeklindeki asılsız varsayıma dayandığından şikâyet etseler de siyasal liberalizmi eleştiren pek çok kişi bunun başarılı olduğundan şüphe eder. Bu çalışmada, Rawls tarafından özellikle geç dönem yazılarda kullanılan gerekçelendirme stratejisi içsel olarak eleştirmeye çalışılacaktır. Siyasi meselelerle ilgili ihtilaf durumlarında vatandaşların siyasi değerlere siyasi olmayan değerlere göre öncelik vermesine dair bize makul bir umut sunamayacağına işaret edilecektir. Ayrıca, Rawls'un kapsamlı olmama, çoğulculuğu sağlama ve koruma kaygısına yönelik açıklamalarının eksikliklerinin gösterilmesi hedeflenmektedir.

References

  • Arnhart, L. (2013). Platon’dan Rawls’a Siyasi Düşünce Tarihi. (A. K. Bayram, Çev.). Ankara: Adres Yayınları.
  • Buchanan, A. (2007). Justice, Legitimacy, and Self Determination. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Cohen, J. (2004). “The Importance of Philosophy: Reflections on Rawls”. South African Journal of Philosophy, 23(2), 113-119.
  • Donnan, M. (2007). Rawls’s Notion of Overlapping Consensus by Michael Donnan. https://oxfordphilsoc.org/Documents/Chadwick/2007_1.pdf.
  • Dreben, B. (2003). “On Rawls and Political Liberalism”. The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (S. Freeman, Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 316-346.
  • Dworkin, R. (1979). “Original Position”. Reading Rawls (N. Daniels, Ed.). New York: Basic Books, 16-53.
  • Fabbrizi, V. (2015). “Overlapping Consensus and Contitutional Consensus Another Interpretation”. Paper presented at Conference Philosophy and Social Sciences. Prague-Villa Lanna.
  • Ferrara, A. (1998). Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity. London: Routledge.
  • Ferrara, A. (2017). “The Legacy of Rawls’s Political Liberalism and Its Future”. Jura Gentium, The Prospect for Liberal-Democracy in Troubled Times, xiv, 96-130.
  • Freeman, S. (2003a). The Cambridge Companion To Rawls. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Freeman, S. (2003b). “John Rawls – An Overview”. Cambridge Companion to Rawls (S. Freeman, Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-59.
  • Freyenhagen, F. (2011). Taking Reasonable Pluralism Seriously: An Internal Critique of Political Liberalism. Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 10(3), 323–342.
  • Friedman, M. (2000). “John Rawls and the Political Coercion of Unreasonable People”. The Idea of a Political Liberalism: Essays on John Rawls (V. Davion and C. Wolf, Ed.). (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefieldin, 16-34.
  • Gray, J. (2000). Two Faces of Liberalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.
  • Greenawalt, K. (1994). “On Public Reason”. Chicago Kent Law Review. 69, 669–689.
  • Habermas, J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Doscourse Theory of Law and Democracy (W. Rehg, Trans.). Cambridge: MIT Press.
  • Hampton, J. (1993). “The Moral Commitments of Liberalism”. The Idea of Democracy (Copp, Hampton, and Roemer, Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 292–313.
  • Klosko, G. (1994). “Rawls’s Argument From Political Stability”. Columbia Law Review, 94, 1882-1897.
  • Kymlicka, W. (1989a). Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Kymlicka, W. (1989b). “Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality”. Ethics, 99(4), 883-905.
  • Kymlicka, W. (2002). Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Kukathas, C. & Pettit P. (1990). Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California.
  • Langerak, E. (1994). “Pluralism, Tolerance, and Disagreement”, Rhetoric Society of America, 24, 95-106.
  • Maffettone, S. (2010). Rawls, An Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press.
  • Marx, K. ve Engels, F. (1976). Komünist Manifesto. (M. Erdost. Çev.). Ankara: Sol Yayınları.
  • Michelman, F. (2003). “Rawls on Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law”. The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (S. Freeman, Ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press.
  • Mills, C. (2000). “Not a Mere Modus Vivendi: The Bases for Allegiance to the Just State”. The Idea of a Political Liberalism (V. Davion and C. Wolf, Ed.). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 190-203.
  • Mouffe, C. (2000). The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso.
  • Mouffe, C. (2005). “The Limits of John Rawls's Pluralism”. Politics Philosophy Economics, 4(2), 221-231.
  • Nagel, T. (2003). “Rawls and Liberalism”. Cambridge Companion to Rawls (S. Freeman, Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 62-86.
  • Nielsen, K. (1978). “On The Very Possibility of A Classless Society: Rawls, Macpherson and Revisionist Liberalism”. Political Theory, 6(2), 191-208.
  • Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.
  • Pogge, T. (2007). John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice. (M. Kosch, Trans.). Oxford University Press.
  • Rawls, J. (1985). “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical”. Collected Papers (S. Freeman, Ed.). Harvard University Press, 47-72.
  • Rawls, J. (1987). “The Idea of An Ovelapping Consensus”. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 7(1), 1–25.
  • Rawls, J. (1989). “The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus”. Collected Papers (S. Freeman, Ed.). Harvard University Press, 473-496.
  • Rawls, J. (1996). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
  • Rawls, J. (1997). “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”. University of Chicago Law Review, 64, 440-490.
  • Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice. Revised edition, Oxford University Press.
  • Rawls, J. (2006). Halkların Yasası ve Kamusal Akıl Düşüncesinin Yeniden Ele Alınması. (G. Evrin, Çev.). İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
  • Rawls, J. (2007a). Lectures of History of Political Philosophy. (S. Freeman, Ed.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  • Rawls, J. (2007b). Siyasal Liberalizm. (M. F. Bilgin, Çev.). İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
  • Rawls, J. (2017). Bir Adalet Teorisi. (V. A. Coşan, Çev.). İstanbul: Phoenix.
  • Talisse, R. (2001). On Rawls: A Liberal Theory of Justice and Justification. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth.
  • Talisse, R. (2003). “Rawls On Pluralism and Stability”. Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society, 15:1-2, 219-246.
  • Waldron, J. (2004). Law and Disagreement. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Wolff, R. P. (1977). Understanding Rawls. Princeton: New Jersey, Princeton University Press.

Overlapping Consensus and Reasonability in Rawls Thought

Year 2023, Volume: 24 Issue: 3, 445 - 458, 31.07.2023
https://doi.org/10.37880/cumuiibf.1287125

Abstract

Rawls’ political liberalism abandons the traditional goal of political theory to provide a philosophical account of liberal democracy. However, Rawls also aims for a liberal political order endorsed by citizens on deeper grounds than what he calls “modus vivendi” consensus. But the aspiration for a pluralistic and free liberalism seems to contradict the goal of a liberalism sanctioned as something more profound than a modus vivendi compromise between competing comprehensive doctrines. A liberalism promoted “for its own sake” rather than a compromise must necessarily be based on the kind of notion of the good that political liberalism violates. We think that why Rawls tries to offer a moral justification that isn’t comprehensive in his political philosophy but, nonetheless. Many critics of political liberalism doubt its success, although proponents of Rawls’ view often complain that such criticisms are based on the false assumption that no moral justification can be offered other than following a philosophically comprehensive path. In this article we’ll try to internally criticize the justification strategy used by Rawls, especially in his later writings. It’ll be pointed out that in situations of conflict over political issues, citizens cannot offer us any reasonable hope of prioritizing political values over non-political values. In addition, it’s aimed to show the shortcomings of Rawls’ explanations for not being comprehensive, providing pluralism, and concern for protection.

References

  • Arnhart, L. (2013). Platon’dan Rawls’a Siyasi Düşünce Tarihi. (A. K. Bayram, Çev.). Ankara: Adres Yayınları.
  • Buchanan, A. (2007). Justice, Legitimacy, and Self Determination. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Cohen, J. (2004). “The Importance of Philosophy: Reflections on Rawls”. South African Journal of Philosophy, 23(2), 113-119.
  • Donnan, M. (2007). Rawls’s Notion of Overlapping Consensus by Michael Donnan. https://oxfordphilsoc.org/Documents/Chadwick/2007_1.pdf.
  • Dreben, B. (2003). “On Rawls and Political Liberalism”. The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (S. Freeman, Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 316-346.
  • Dworkin, R. (1979). “Original Position”. Reading Rawls (N. Daniels, Ed.). New York: Basic Books, 16-53.
  • Fabbrizi, V. (2015). “Overlapping Consensus and Contitutional Consensus Another Interpretation”. Paper presented at Conference Philosophy and Social Sciences. Prague-Villa Lanna.
  • Ferrara, A. (1998). Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity. London: Routledge.
  • Ferrara, A. (2017). “The Legacy of Rawls’s Political Liberalism and Its Future”. Jura Gentium, The Prospect for Liberal-Democracy in Troubled Times, xiv, 96-130.
  • Freeman, S. (2003a). The Cambridge Companion To Rawls. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Freeman, S. (2003b). “John Rawls – An Overview”. Cambridge Companion to Rawls (S. Freeman, Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-59.
  • Freyenhagen, F. (2011). Taking Reasonable Pluralism Seriously: An Internal Critique of Political Liberalism. Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 10(3), 323–342.
  • Friedman, M. (2000). “John Rawls and the Political Coercion of Unreasonable People”. The Idea of a Political Liberalism: Essays on John Rawls (V. Davion and C. Wolf, Ed.). (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefieldin, 16-34.
  • Gray, J. (2000). Two Faces of Liberalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.
  • Greenawalt, K. (1994). “On Public Reason”. Chicago Kent Law Review. 69, 669–689.
  • Habermas, J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Doscourse Theory of Law and Democracy (W. Rehg, Trans.). Cambridge: MIT Press.
  • Hampton, J. (1993). “The Moral Commitments of Liberalism”. The Idea of Democracy (Copp, Hampton, and Roemer, Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 292–313.
  • Klosko, G. (1994). “Rawls’s Argument From Political Stability”. Columbia Law Review, 94, 1882-1897.
  • Kymlicka, W. (1989a). Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  • Kymlicka, W. (1989b). “Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality”. Ethics, 99(4), 883-905.
  • Kymlicka, W. (2002). Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Kukathas, C. & Pettit P. (1990). Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California.
  • Langerak, E. (1994). “Pluralism, Tolerance, and Disagreement”, Rhetoric Society of America, 24, 95-106.
  • Maffettone, S. (2010). Rawls, An Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press.
  • Marx, K. ve Engels, F. (1976). Komünist Manifesto. (M. Erdost. Çev.). Ankara: Sol Yayınları.
  • Michelman, F. (2003). “Rawls on Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law”. The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (S. Freeman, Ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press.
  • Mills, C. (2000). “Not a Mere Modus Vivendi: The Bases for Allegiance to the Just State”. The Idea of a Political Liberalism (V. Davion and C. Wolf, Ed.). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 190-203.
  • Mouffe, C. (2000). The Democratic Paradox. London: Verso.
  • Mouffe, C. (2005). “The Limits of John Rawls's Pluralism”. Politics Philosophy Economics, 4(2), 221-231.
  • Nagel, T. (2003). “Rawls and Liberalism”. Cambridge Companion to Rawls (S. Freeman, Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 62-86.
  • Nielsen, K. (1978). “On The Very Possibility of A Classless Society: Rawls, Macpherson and Revisionist Liberalism”. Political Theory, 6(2), 191-208.
  • Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.
  • Pogge, T. (2007). John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice. (M. Kosch, Trans.). Oxford University Press.
  • Rawls, J. (1985). “Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical”. Collected Papers (S. Freeman, Ed.). Harvard University Press, 47-72.
  • Rawls, J. (1987). “The Idea of An Ovelapping Consensus”. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 7(1), 1–25.
  • Rawls, J. (1989). “The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus”. Collected Papers (S. Freeman, Ed.). Harvard University Press, 473-496.
  • Rawls, J. (1996). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
  • Rawls, J. (1997). “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”. University of Chicago Law Review, 64, 440-490.
  • Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice. Revised edition, Oxford University Press.
  • Rawls, J. (2006). Halkların Yasası ve Kamusal Akıl Düşüncesinin Yeniden Ele Alınması. (G. Evrin, Çev.). İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
  • Rawls, J. (2007a). Lectures of History of Political Philosophy. (S. Freeman, Ed.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  • Rawls, J. (2007b). Siyasal Liberalizm. (M. F. Bilgin, Çev.). İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
  • Rawls, J. (2017). Bir Adalet Teorisi. (V. A. Coşan, Çev.). İstanbul: Phoenix.
  • Talisse, R. (2001). On Rawls: A Liberal Theory of Justice and Justification. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth.
  • Talisse, R. (2003). “Rawls On Pluralism and Stability”. Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society, 15:1-2, 219-246.
  • Waldron, J. (2004). Law and Disagreement. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Wolff, R. P. (1977). Understanding Rawls. Princeton: New Jersey, Princeton University Press.

Details

Primary Language Turkish
Subjects Political Science
Journal Section Makaleler
Authors

Ferdi SELİM 0000-0003-2576-4499

Early Pub Date July 28, 2023
Publication Date July 31, 2023
Submission Date April 25, 2023
Published in Issue Year 2023Volume: 24 Issue: 3

Cite

APA SELİM, F. (2023). Rawls Düşüncesinde Örtüşen Görüş Birliği ve Makuliyet. Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi İktisadi Ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi, 24(3), 445-458. https://doi.org/10.37880/cumuiibf.1287125

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