Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi

Öz

This study examines Iran’s foreign policy strategy following the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack on Israel, through the lens of Prospect Theory. It argues that Iran's strategic approach has been shaped by a perception of strategic constraint that emerged in 2020. In this study, strategic constraint is defined as the perceived reduction in Iran’s ability to maintain and project regional influence due to external pressures, shifting alliances, and significant geopolitical setbacks. This perception includes not only material limitations but also Iran’s psychological assessment of its declining strategic leverage and the weakening of its regional deterrence posture. The main argument of this article is that Iran interpreted Hamas’ Operation Al-Aqsa Flood as a strategic opportunity, which is reflected in its actions following October 7. In this context, Iran has pursued a strategy that leverages the Palestinian issue to apply pressure on Israel—most notably through direct attacks such as Operation True Promise I and II—with the broader aim of expanding the operational scope of the axis of resistance. Using Prospect Theory as the analytical framework—particularly the concepts of reference dependence, loss aversion, framing effects, and varying risk attitudes—this study explores how Iran’s risk-taking behavior is rooted in psychological responses to perceived strategic losses. Ultimately, this case study argues that despite Iran’s efforts to revitalize the axis of resistance, its broader objectives have been constrained by the erosion of influence in Syria and the weakening of key proxy actors, resulting in limited strategic success.